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PREFACE
Many macroeconomic forces affect international trade. These include nominal
uncertainty, exchange rate movements, and each country’s business cycle. This dis-
sertation consists of three essays which explore the impact of these macroeconomic
forces.
In the first chapter, I consider the choice firms face between serving a foreign
market through exports or producing abroad as a multinational. They face volatile
nominal conditions in the foreign market, and I show how rising volatility shifts
firms away from multinational production towards exporting. Exporting firms gain
a greater advantage from foreign contractions because their goods become relatively
cheaper in foreign currency terms. I use U.S. trade and multinational sales data and
show that in countries with greater inflation volatility, we observe a higher proportion
of exports.
In the second chapter, I examine whether our improved understanding of interna-
tional price setting helps to explain international trade flows themselves when subject
to exchange rate shocks. While menu cost models with strategic complementarities
are capable of matching the observed characteristics of international prices, I find that
they still perform relatively poorly in explaining trade flows. This class of models,
despite having fairly low short-run pass-through to import prices, still implies a large
trade value response to exchange rate changes. Furthermore, sectors with more flex-
ible prices or more substitutable goods respond very similarly to those with stickier
prices or less substitutable goods, contrary to the implications of the model.
Finally, in joint work with Andrei Levchenko and Linda Tesar, the third chap-
ter studies the collapse of international trade during 2008-2009. We show how the
composition of trade is important for understanding why it is so much more volatile
over the business cycle. The U.S. trades disproportionately in sectors where domestic
production or consumption also dropped significantly, like durable consumption and
capital goods. On the other hand, we find no evidence for other commonly cited
factors, like credit conditions or inventories.
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CHAPTER I
Exports versus Multinational Production under
Nominal Uncertainty
1.1 Introduction
Multinational production plays an important role in how firms serve foreign mar-
kets. For a typical major trading partner, sales of foreign affiliates of U.S. firms
are greater than exports. This paper considers how nominal uncertainty affects the
decision firms make between serving the foreign market through multinational pro-
duction or exports. There is strong evidence that U.S. export prices are very sticky
and are denominated in dollars. Because multinational production is priced in the
foreign currency, there is a potentially important distinction in how foreign nominal
uncertainty affects the choice firms make on the margin.
I develop a model with heterogeneous firms and an endogenous decision to export
or set up foreign production. Firms set prices and make production-location decisions
in advance, so foreign nominal uncertainty affects expected profits. Nominal uncer-
tainty takes the form of a stochastic money growth rate rule. I show that if both
exports and multinational production are priced in the foreign currency, nominal un-
certainty does not affect the choice of how to serve the foreign market. If, as in U.S.
data, exports are instead priced in dollars, then exporting becomes relatively more
attractive as foreign volatility rises. The intuition is that given a foreign nominal
contraction, an exporter with a price stuck in dollars gains a pricing advantage over
an equivalent multinational producer whose price is stuck in the foreign currency.
This makes expected profits of exporters more convex in foreign volatility.
Recent work demonstrates that nominal uncertainty is important for understand-
ing international transactions. Schoenle (2010) shows that U.S. export prices are
more sticky than domestic U.S. prices, with durations of at least one year on average.
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Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) provide evidence that nearly all such prices are denom-
inated in US dollars. By contrast, production abroad is likely to be denominated in
the local currency. This distinction is crucial for understanding how firms react to
differences in nominal uncertainty in the model.
The analysis is based on the canonical Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) frame-
work of trade and multinational production, extended to a stochastic environment.
Firms are heterogeneous in productivity, and face higher fixed costs to produce abroad
than to export. Firms with high productivity find it more desirable to produce abroad
to avoid per-unit transportation costs. Uncertainty plays a role through the non-linear
effects of monetary shocks on expected profits. This in turn affects the extensive mar-
gin of firm participation in each market. I start with a straightforward benchmark,
where both exports and multinational production are priced in advance in the local
currency. Here, nominal uncertainty affects neither the extensive nor intensive margin
of exporting relative to multinational production. Because U.S. exports are priced
in dollars rather than the local currency, however, I consider an alternative where
exports are priced in the exporter’s currency and multinational production is priced
in the local currency. In this case, exporter profits are more convex in foreign nominal
volatility. This in turn implies that as volatility rises, multinational production as
a fraction of total foreign sales (multinational production plus exports) falls in the
model.
I then consider the empirical evidence. Using bilateral data for U.S. exports and
sales by foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals, I examine the impact of inflation
volatility on the relative choice. I find that, as predicted by the model, inflation
volatility tends to decrease the share of MP relative to exports. Separating the
regressions for each major sector, I find that the coefficient on volatility is signifi-
cant for information, electrical, food, machinery, and transportation manufacturing.
Other manufacturing sectors have the expected sign, while mining has a positive and
insignificant sign. Since mining is a commodity industry where prices tend to be
very flexibly spot-priced, this is unsurprising. The results underscore the importance
of sectoral heterogeneity in short-term behavior caused in part by the price-setting
characteristics of that sector.
On the other hand, exchange rate volatility has, if anything, the opposite effect.
The coefficient on exchange rate volatility tends to be positive but not statistically
significant. This suggests that while the mechanism in the model holds for inflation
volatility, there may be additional effects from exchange rate volatility which may
be derived from different underlying shocks. The mechanism in my model simply
2
requires that the exchange rate volatility caused by nominal volatility goes in the
modeled direction; that is, a foreign nominal contraction leads to a foreign exchange
rate appreciation. Since exchange rate volatility can be caused by a multitude of
other sources, the empirical results are consistent with the model. I conclude with
a discussion of these results and mechanisms by which exchange rate volatility may
have different effects from the nominal volatility typically modeled.
This paper contributes to a recent and rapidly growing literature on understanding
the effects of various forms of uncertainty in general equilibrium. Most of the recent
work focuses on real uncertainty, including Ramondo and Rappoport (2010), Irar-
razabal and Opromolla (2009), Fillat and Garetto (2010), and Ramondo, Rappoport
and Ruhl (2010). These papers study either country or firm-specific uncertainty
about productivity under flexible prices. In particular, Ramondo et al. (2010) studies
the choice of exporting versus multinational production given aggregate uncertainty
about country output. They find that the U.S. exports more to countries with more
volatile GDP.1
The literature considering nominal uncertainty is relatively sparse. In a partial
equilibrium context, Giovannini (1988) studies the effects of exchange rates on exports
given assumptions about the currency of prices set in advance. Goldberg and Kolstad
(1995) study the production-location decision under a combination of exchange rate
and demand shocks, with production capacity set in advance and flexible prices. The
main results in that paper are driven by firms having some degree of risk aversion.
In more recent general equilibrium work, Russ (2007) analyzes the effects of foreign
versus domestic nominal uncertainty on multinational production (and by extension,
FDI).2 She demonstrates that while either source of volatility translates to exchange
rate volatility, foreign volatility encourages multinational production in the foreign
market while domestic volatility deters it. All prices are local-currency priced, and
firms cannot export.
This paper differs from the literature in two respects. First, I study nominal uncer-
tainty in the form of inflation volatility. Since we observe substantial price stickiness
as noted above, it is important to understand how nominal volatility interacts with
this stickiness to affects firms’ decisions in general equilibrium. Second, the economic
mechanism I propose in this paper is distinct, focusing on the difference between
1My model predicts the same basic comparative static with a completely different channel. I
explore the empirical relationship between the two papers in Section 1.5.2.
2In addition, Cavallari (2010) studies real and nominal uncertainty with exports and multina-
tional production in a model without firm heterogeneity and thus without an explicit choice of how
to serve the foreign market. See also Cavallari (2008) and Cavallari (2007).
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the currency denomination of exports compared to multinational production. Thus,
differences in foreign volatility change how domestic firms serve the foreign market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the overall model
environment. Section 3 details the specifics of the model in which exports are priced
in the local currency. Section 4 describes the alternative model with exports priced
in the producer’s currency. Section 5 introduces the data and estimation strategy for
testing the model. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Model setup
Consider a 2-country model (home H and foreign F ) inhabited by representative
households that maximize utility over consumption, labor (leisure), and real money
holdings. The countries trade a complete set of state-contingent bonds; this focuses
the model’s implications of uncertainty on firms. Each country has its own currency
with a stochastic growth rate which is exogenously driven.
Firms face fixed costs for producing domestically, exporting, and serving foreign
markets via multinational production (MP). Exporters face relatively smaller fixed
costs but pay per-unit transportation costs, while multinationals avoid transportation
costs and face higher fixed costs. This structure is the basis of Helpman et al. (2004)
and a subsequent literature focusing on static determinants of trade and multinational
patterns.
To keep the benchmark model as tractable as possible, prices are set one period in
advance. With a period defined as a year, this is consistent with empirical evidence
of export price durations of at least one year. Trade consists of monopolistically
competitive intermediate goods and firms have heterogeneous production based on a
permanent fixed draw from a productivity distribution. Labor is the only input of
production.
1.2.1 Households
Each country is occupied by a representative household which maximizes the ex-
pected discounted stream of utility U(·), choosing consumption Ct, labor supplied
Lt, bond holdings B, and real money balances Mt/Pt. For tractability, assume that




















Q(st+1|st)B(st+1) +Mt = Mt−1 +WtLt +B(st) + Πt + Tt,
where st denotes the state of the world at time t, Q(st+1|st) are the price of state-
contingent bonds, Πt are profits from domestic firms, and Tt are transfers of seignior-
age revenue from changes in the money supply. This leads to familiar first order
conditions shown in the appendix.
Foreign households have an analogous problem, and the real and nominal ex-
change rates are solved by equating the price of state-contingent bonds Q(st+1|st)
and iterating backwards (see Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002)). The nominal
exchange rate, defined as the ratio of the home currency to the foreign currency, can












, the expected inverse of the money growth rate, and α∗ is
its foreign counterpart. Intuitively, the nominal exchange rate in any given period
depends on the ratio of the money supplies; an increase in home currency M leads
to a depreciation (increase in S) of the home nominal exchange rate. The money
growth rate terms are derived from the partial derivative of utility with respect to
money holdings. As the volatility of the foreign money growth rate rises, so does α∗.
This, all else equal, leads to a higher St (home currency depreciation).
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Households consume a basket of domestic and foreign varieties through CES ag-









While there is no explicit home-bias in preferences over varieties in this setup, trans-
portation costs and fixed costs will yield lower imports relative to a frictionless econ-
omy. In addition, complete markets and labor entering linearly in the utility function
imply that wages between the two countries are equalized (Wt = StW
∗
t ). Section
1.3.6 discusses factor price equalization in more detail.
3Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) discuss the effects of relaxing the log-utility assumption over money
balances. They also emphasize that this result holds regardless of whether prices are sticky.
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1.2.2 Monetary process
The uncertainty and volatility in the model stem from a stochastic money growth
rate rule, found commonly in the literature4. I assume that the money supply grows
at a stochastic log-normal rate with a mean-preserving spread:
Mt
Mt−1









with a similar process for the foreign country. This implies that the inverse of the
money growth rate α = eσ
2
m .5
1.2.3 Intermediate goods producers
Each firm i faces a linear production technology with heterogeneous productivity
φ(i) and uses labor l(i), so that y(i) = φ(i)l(i).
To maximize tractability and keep the focus on nominal uncertainty, I follow
Helpman et al. (2004) and Russ (2007) and assume that firms face per-period fixed
costs for domestic entry f , exporting fX , and multinational production fMP . Firms
which export pay an iceberg trade cost τ > 1 to have one unit arrive at the destination.
For choices of f and fX consistent with the data, no firm will choose to export but
not produce domestically. As in Helpman et al. (2004), I assume that multinational
production fixed costs are higher than export fixed costs fMP > fX , consistent with
data on firm sales.6
1.3 Model with exports priced in the local currency
In this section, I demonstrate that if exports and multinational production are
both priced in the foreign currency (local currency pricing), then nominal uncertainty
does not affect the relative choice of how to serve the foreign market. I derive the
optimal price setting behavior and feed this into the zero-profit cutoff conditions for
being an exporter or a multinational producer.
4e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998), Chari et al. (2002), Russ (2007).
5For notational simplicity, I abstract from a constant growth rate term, which does not qualita-
tively affect the results.
6While in principle firms could produce abroad for re-export to the home market, transportation
costs work in both directions and thus this will be undesirable without some sort of cost advantage.
If factor price equalization does not hold and re-exports were permitted, this would be dependent
on the calibration of transportation costs versus the wage differentials. For simplicity in all setups,
I exclude the possibility of foreign affiliates exporting back to the parent country. Such production
technology is often associated with vertical integration and is outside the scope of this paper.
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1.3.1 Price setting
To fix intuition, first consider the the optimal flexible price. With CES demand
over varieties, this is the familiar condition that prices are set as a fixed markup θ
θ−1
over marginal costs. For a home firm selling in the home market, those marginal
costs are Wt
φ
, where φ is the productivity of the firm. For a home firm exporting to
the foreign market, those costs are Wtτ
φSt
(denominated in the foreign currency), as the
firm must pay the iceberg trade cost. Finally, multinationals face marginal costs in




1.3.1.1 Domestic price setting in advance
Domestic firms set prices for domestic sales through the following optimization:
max
pH,t
Et−1 [dt(pH,tyH,t −WtlH,t)] ,







is the stochastic discount factor of the investors. One can show














where again φ is the productivity of the firm.7
1.3.1.2 MP price setting in advance
Consider home firms who choose to engage in multinational production in the
foreign market.8 I make the reasonable assumption that these prices are pre-set in
the foreign currency (LCP), as the products are produced and consumed entirely in













7Note that if Pt is non-stochastic (e.g. if all prices are set in the local currency), then it may
be canceled out of the expectation operators. This proves crucial in simplifying the expressions
analytically, making the case of producer cost pricing in Section 1.4 substantially more difficult.
8For the purposes of this paper, I restrict firms to either serve the foreign market through MP
or exporting, but not both. It can be shown that with export prices set in the local currency, firms
will never wish to both export and produce abroad.
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where pH,MP,t is the price choice of home-owned multinationals in the foreign market,






















1.3.1.3 Exporter price setting in advance, local currency pricing
Consider now home firms who choose to serve the foreign market through export-
ing. Empirically, whether exports are producer cost priced (PCP) or local currency
priced (LCP) depends on the particular bilateral relationship. I do not endogenize
the choice here,9 but rather take the choice as given and examine the implications. I
find that the currency choice has important implications for the effects of uncertainty.
First I consider the case where exports, like multinational production, are LCP.













Since pH,LCP,t is set in the foreign currency, this revenue is repatriated with the
nominal exchange rate St. Real demand depends only on the relative price and





C∗t . Substituting this into the maximization





















Factor price equalization implies that Wt = StW
∗
t . Thus, it is straightforward to see
that for a given productivity φ, the relative price choice is simply pF,MP,t/pF,LCP,t =
τ−1. That is, none of the expectations play a role in the optimal price choice between
multinational production and an exporter who sets prices in the local currency. This
result is intuitive in that with factor price equalization holding both in expectation
and ex-post, firms should not set different prices except to account for transportation
costs.
9See Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon (2010), Bhattarai (2009), and Engel (2006) for examples
of papers which endogenize this choice.
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1.3.2 Export cutoff
Define φ̂X,t as the cutoff productivity at time t for a home firm looking to enter
the foreign market. If a firm has a productivity above this level, it will either choose
to export to the foreign market or set up a factory there. The marginal firm at the













dt St−1P ∗t fX︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed costs
 = 0 ≡ ξ(φ̂X), (1.3)
where again dt is the stochastic discount factor of the home firm, pH,LCP,t is the
price of the good paid by foreign households (in the foreign currency), yH,LCP,t is the
demand of the good at that price, and Wt is the home wage. Define ξ(φ) as the net
profit from exporting for a firm with productivity φ.
1.3.3 Multinational production cutoff
Define φ̂MP,t as the cutoff productivity at time t above which a firm optimally
chooses to serve the foreign market through multinational production rather than
exporting. It is the productivity at which expected profits net of fixed costs are equal












St−1P ∗t fMP︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed costs
− ξ(φ̂MP,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit from exporting
= 0, (1.4)
where the first term is expected export profits of a firm with productivity φ̂MP,t and
the second term is expected multinational profits of the same firm. With further
9
assumptions about the nature of firm price setting, these cutoff expressions can be
written in terms of the underlying exogenous variables.
1.3.4 Results
Consider now the case in which prices are set one period in advance, and both
export and multinational prices are set in the foreign currency. In this case, the
ratio of the export price relative to the multinational price charged by a firm with















If factor price equalization holds, the expectations cancel and the firms charge the
same price after accounting for trade costs. It can then be shown that the relative






fX (τ θ−1 − 1)
.
Thus, the relative extensive margin is unaffected by nominal uncertainty. The exten-
sive margin is illustrated in Figure 1.1. Here, profits are shown on the vertical axis,
and productivity (to the power θ−1 > 0) is shown in the horizontal axis. The dotted
lines represent the initial (stochastic) steady state, and the solid (green) lines depict
the change after an increase in foreign volatility.
Firms engage in domestic production if their expected profits exceed the fixed
cost f ; this is where the expected profit line crosses the x-axis. A foreign firm with
productivity higher than φ̂∗D will produce in the foreign market. Similarly, a firm will
export if its expected profits exceed the fixed cost fX . Since exports are subject to a
transportation cost, these profit lines have a flatter slope and even with the same fixed
cost as domestic production, there would be a higher threshold φ̂X to export. Finally,
very productive firms will find it optimal to switch to multinational production if the
expected profit from producing abroad exceeds the expected profit from exporting;
that is, the cutoff φ̂MP lies where the expected profits from exporting E[πX ] and
multinational production E[πMP ] intersect.
An increase in foreign volatility has a negative impact on the foreign producers,
while it encourages both exports and multinational production. The intuition is that
foreign volatility is good for home producers because a foreign monetary contraction
10
coincides with a foreign currency appreciation, more than compensating the home
producers. So both cutoffs fall. But what about actual trade flows and multinational
sales? For that, I must be more explicit about the shape of the firm distribution.
Proposition I.1 demonstrates sufficient conditions under which the export and multi-
national sales changes are proportional.
Proposition I.1. If firm productivity is characterized by a Pareto distribution, ex-
ports are priced in the foreign currency, and factor price equalization holds, then the
ratio of multinational sales to exports is unaffected by uncertainty.
Proof. See appendix.
The basic intuition of the proof is that if relative prices are unaffected by nominal
volatility, then the relative sales of multinationals and exporters depends only on the
mass of firms of each type and the ratio of average productivities. With a Pareto
distribution, it can be shown that the ratio of average productivities and ratio of the
mass of firms remain constant as volatility changes.
1.3.5 A note on the flexible price case
It is useful to understand the model’s implications under flexible prices for the
extensive margin choice between multinational production and exporting. The only
decision made in advance is that of whether and how to produce for the foreign market.
The cutoff conditions are still a function of expected profits, which could be influenced
by any number of shocks. The following proposition demonstrates formally that so
long as factor price equalization holds, the relative extensive margin is unaffected by
any uncertainty about future consumption, exchange rates, prices, etc.
Proposition I.2. With flexible prices and factor price equalization, the relative exten-
sive margin between exports and multinational production is unaffected by uncertainty.
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Et−1[dtStP ∗θt C∗tW ∗1−θt ]
Et−1[dtSθt P ∗θt C∗tW 1−θt ]
− 1
) .
Here, we can see that the effects of uncertainty reduce down to a ratio
Et−1[dtStP ∗θt C∗tW ∗1−θt ]
Et−1[dtSθt P ∗θt C∗tW 1−θt ]
.
Note that if factor price equalization holds, i.e. StW
∗
t = Wt, then this ratio equals 1.
Then the relative cutoff expression becomes fMP−fX
fx
(τ θ−1 − 1)−1, exactly that found
by Helpman et al. (2004) in a deterministic setting. Thus, with flexible prices, any
effect of uncertainty on the relative extensive margin requires factor price equalization
not to hold. This is true regardless of the presence of other sectors with sticky prices
and regardless of the underlying shock process.
1.3.6 Factor price equalization
Factor price equalization holds in the baseline model because of complete markets
and labor entering linearly in the utility function, as noted by Devereux and Engel









the real exchange rate is the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption, it follows that







, and thus Wt = StW
∗
t .
One can relax the assumption about complete markets or the assumption about
labor entering linearly. Relaxing incomplete markets will not provide very large devi-
ations from factor price equalization, as the exchange rate will follow roughly similar
dynamics (Chari et al. 2002). Labor entering with an exponent 1 + ν and ν > 0, can
break factor price equalization more substantially. Here, the first order conditions be-




t . Thus, as more labor is utilized for a given level of consumption,
wages must rise to compensate households.
While this is certainly a reasonable assumption, it produces wage dynamics soundly
rejected by the data. Maintaining the assumption of FPE, we have in logs Ŵt =
Ŝt + Ŵ
∗
t . In the data, the wage-based real exchange rate (from relative unit labor
costs) corresponds to Wt
StW ∗t
, which is far from constant, and tracks the nominal ex-
change rate closely. That is, Ŵt ≈ Ŵt
∗
. With non-linear labor, the model implies
that given a home monetary expansion, home wages rise more than foreign wages
expressed in the home currency. That is, Ŵt > Ŝt + Ŵ
∗
t . This makes nominal wages
even more volatile, contrary to the data.
12
1.4 Model where exports are priced in the producer’s cur-
rency
1.4.1 Exporter price setting in advance, producer cost pricing
Suppose instead that exporters set prices in their own currency. This is the pre-
dominant case for the U.S., where 97% of exports are priced in dollars (Gopinath and
Rigobon 2008). That is, pH,PCP,t is dollar-denominated, and changes to the nominal
exchange rate St have complete pass-through to the foreign-currency price faced by
households pH,PCP,t/St.


















































































− Et−1[dtSt−1P ∗t fx] = 0 ≡ ξ(φ̂X).
Where ξ(φ) is the net profit of an exporter for any productivity φ. Using this, the
13












St−1P ∗t fMP︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed costs
− ξ(φ̂MP,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit from exporting
= 0.
1.4.2 A numerical illustration
With producer cost pricing, multinational revenue and export revenue are now
affected differently by nominal volatility. Multinational revenue is a function only of
demand C∗t , since the price is set in advance in the foreign currency. Export revenue
varies with the exchange rate as pass-through to export prices in the foreign currency
is complete.
Since export prices now vary with the exchange rate, the price index P ∗t becomes
uncertain at date t−1. This substantially complicates solving the model analytically,
so I proceed numerically by discretizing the state space for the foreign money supply
M∗ and computing the stochastic steady state for various σ2m∗ .
To do this, I must calibrate the model parameters.10 Table 2.1 outlines the pa-
rameters in the model. Most parameters are very standard; as is common in the
trade literature, I use an elasticity of substitution between varieties of 5, in the mid-
dle of most estimates.11 The Pareto shape parameter k governing the distribution
of firm productivities is taken to be very close to the elasticity of substitution, as in
Russ (2007). Iceberg trade costs of 20% are within the range of estimated tariffs and
freight costs. This leaves the fixed costs. I set the fixed costs of domestic production
and export to be the same, as the focus here is on multinational production.12 I set
the fixed costs of multinational production to be consistent with 60% of the value of
foreign sales to come from multinational affiliates, consistent with the average of the
data used in Section 1.5.
As the variance of the foreign money supply grows, exporting becomes relatively
more attractive compared to multinational production. Consider an unexpected for-
10Experimentation with the model parameters reveals that the main qualitative results are not
sensitive to the precise parameters chosen.
11See Ruhl (2008) for a survey.
12These fixed costs imply that 35% of potential entrants export and 90% produce domestically
under no uncertainty.
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eign contraction. Demand C∗t falls for both multinational firms and exporters, and
the foreign exchange rate appreciates (St rises). This makes profits denominated in
the home currency higher for both exporters and multinationals.13 In addition, the
exporter’s price, set in the home currency, becomes relatively cheaper in foreign cur-
rency terms. This stimulates greater demand, and the home exporter’s price is closer
to its profit-maximizing point. This automatic adjustment of the price makes a PCP
exporter relatively better off in the presence of higher foreign uncertainty. This effect
tends to dominate regardless of the correlation between foreign demand C∗t and the
exchange rate St, say, from other sources of shocks.
To better understand this, consider first Figure 1.2. It plots the profit of a home
exporter against realizations of the foreign money supply M∗. Each point represents
a value of the foreign money supply on the discretized grid. Starting from the median
of about 1, the probability of moving one point left is equal to the probability of
moving one point right. Clearly, exporter profit is highly convex in the foreign money
supply. The exporter benefits dramatically more from foreign contractions than it
suffers from foreign expansions.
As foreign nominal volatility rises, it increases the likelihood that the firm finds
itself further away from the median point. Since the likelihood of a significant foreign
contraction increases, this increases the expected profit of an exporter.
A multinational benefits from foreign volatility as well. Yet the multinational does
not gain the advantage of having its price automatically lowered in foreign currency
terms as a PCP exporter does. Figure 1.3 shows the relative impact of expected profit
for a sample firm as volatility increases. Multinational profit increases slightly, but it
is dwarfed by the dramatic increase in expected profit for an exporter.
Expected profit is exactly what determines the extensive margin from (1.6). As
expected profit of a potential exporter rises, it draws in firms from both margins: firms
which would otherwise only produce domestically and firms which would otherwise
be multinationals. Figure 1.4 shows the relative impact on the extensive margin
for exporters and multinationals. As volatility rises, many multinationals become
exporters, reducing their mass. Note that because there are many more exporters,
a similar percentage gain in the mass of exporters represents a much larger mass of
firms.
In terms of quantity, this translates to a relatively small drop in multinational
sales; the lowest productivity multinational firms become exporters, so their total
13This is also the basic result from Russ (2007), showing that higher foreign volatility is relatively
better for home firms over foreign firms in the foreign market.
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effect is relatively small. For exporters, on the other hand, these new firms are the
most productive and translate to a large increase in trade. This can be seen in Figure
1.5.
Finally, because the effects of volatility may work through additional unmodeled
channels, I focus on the fraction of multinational sales as a portion of total foreign
sales in Figure 1.6. In both value and quantity terms, the fraction of foreign sales
from multinationals falls as volatility rises. Given the current calibration, going from
no volatility to a volatility of 0.03 leads to a drop in multinational sales from about
60% to below 50%.
1.5 Data
I move now to consider evidence based on U.S. exports and U.S. multinational
foreign affiliate sales. I use multinational sales data from the BEA for 1999-2007 (the
latest year currently available) and match it to export data from the U.S. International
Trade Commission. This data exists at the sector, country, year level. Full details of
the data used in the regressions are available in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 in the appendix.
It is important to keep in mind that both measures are in nominal U.S. dollars.
For trade, the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not construct price indices for each
export destination. Similarly, there are no multinational sales-specific price indices
available by destination country. The analysis in the forthcoming sections will be in
terms of nominal ratios, but these may not necessarily correspond to the real goods
quantity ratios.
I exclude a small number of countries which experienced currency or debt crises
during this time sample.14 Robustness analysis in Section 1.5.2 shows that the main
results of the preferred specification are unaffected by including them.
1.5.1 Results
There are several measures of volatility one might consider to proxy for the nom-
inal volatility in the model. At its most basic, the model has implications for the
money supply growth rate; yet this is a theoretical stand-in for many such nominal
demand forces which an economy may face. Since the data on money supplies is
lacking for some countries in the sample, it makes sense to consider a more widely
available measure: consumer price inflation. In the model, the nominal volatility
directly translates to inflation volatility. On the other hand, it also translates into
14These countries are Argentina, Turkey, Venezuela, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic.
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exchange rate volatility; this may seem like the most logical volatility variable, yet
because exchange rates are influenced by a large number of other shocks, we will see
that inflation can have a very different effect on multinational production compared
to exchange rate volatility.
It is reasonable to think that there could be a large number of shocks affecting
both exports and multinational sales; it makes sense, then, to consider exports and
sales jointly and look for a relative effect. To that end, I estimate the following:
salesi,t
salesi,t + EXi,t
= β0 + β1σ(∆ ln(Pi,t)) + β2σ(∆ ln(Si,t)) + γZi,t + εi,t. (1.7)
where sales is sales by foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals in country i, mapped
to the data as total foreign sales of U.S. affiliates. EX are total exports to country
i. Both are in current U.S. dollars. Thus, the dependent variable is the fraction
of multinational sales as a share of multinational sales and exports. The variable
of interest on the right hand side is σ(∆ ln(Pi,t)), the volatility of the price level in
country i for year t.15 The volatility of the nominal exchange rate is σ(∆ ln(Si,t)),
Z consists of a number of country/time specific variables as controls, and εi,t is the
regression residual. Given the limitations of cross-country regressions, β1 is best
considered a conditional correlation, controlling for other likely determinants of the
dependent variable.
The results pooling available sectors, countries, and years together are presented
in Table 1.2. Each regression has both industry and year dummies, which controls for
changes in the overall business cycle and the particular characteristics of each indus-
try.16 There is a robust negative coefficient on inflation volatility. Economically, this
means an increase in one standard deviation of inflation volatility decreases multi-
national sales as a fraction of total foreign sales by 5 percentage points, or about
one-seventh of a standard deviation in the pooled ratios.
The regressions include a number of controls in columns 2 and 3. Whether the
country is a member of the OECD (generally a developed country status) tends to
have a positive impact on the ratio of multinational sales to exports; this is consistent
with many explanations, including that developed countries have good institutions
which permit horizontal FDI to be more profitable. On the other hand, Mexico and
Canada tend to have lower multinational sales relative to exports; this is consis-
tent with the relatively low transportation costs and tariffs from being members of
15The CPI measures are monthly, and the standard deviation is taken for each year.
16The results are very similar with industry-year dummies.
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NAFTA. GDP per-capita and distance do not have a statistically significant effect,
though the sign on distance is the expected one.
Given that the industry dummies do not control for a heterogeneous impact of
inflation volatility by sector, I re-run the analysis for each sector individually in
Table 1.3. Here, we see that information, electrical, food, machinery, and metals
sectors all have negative and significant coefficients. Chemical manufacturing has
a negative coefficient but it is relatively small and statistically insignificant. The
outlier is mining, an industry which does not lend itself to horizontal FDI in many
cases. Exchange rate volatility is positive and insignificant in all regressions except
information.
1.5.2 Robustness
I subject the pooled results of Section 1.5.1 to a series of robustness checks. The
results are shown in Table 1.4. Column 1 reports the results adding back in the
crisis countries, showing that the results are not sensitive to those outliers. Column
2 includes a number of additional controls, including real GDP volatility with a
significant, negative coefficient, and an array of gravity-equation variables: common
language, former colony, currency union, and landlocked status. In this specification,
none of these additional explanatory variables are statistically significant.
Column 3 performs the same exercise as column 2, but leaves the crisis countries
in. Again, inflation volatility is significantly negative and of similar magnitude, but
now real GDP volatility is not significant. Column 4 instead clusters the errors by
industry rather than country, showing that the statistical significance of inflation
volatility is not sensitive to this choice. Exchange rate volatility, on the other hand,
is now significant and positive.
Columns 5 and 6 report similar regressions with a different dependent variable:
the log of the sales/export ratio. This is the measure used by Ramondo et al. (2010)
in the context of GDP volatility. Without the crisis countries, I find a positive and
insignificant response of inflation volatility, and with the crisis countries the coefficient
becomes negative and insignificant. Exchange rate volatility is positive and significant
in both cases, while real GDP volatility is negative and insignificant.
Note that the log ratio puts substantial weight on observations with relatively
small multinational sales or relatively small exports. In the data, there are a number
of such observations that I plot in Figure 1.7. Some of these observations in the
tails are the result of either zero multinational sales or zero exports; I eliminate
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them in Figure 1.8, showing that a substantial proportion remain.17 The log ratio by
construction eliminates the extreme points while heavily weighting the near extreme
points, making it less suitable for industry-level analysis with a large number of
countries. This would only be compounded with more disaggregated data.
1.5.3 Discussion of exchange rate volatility
The empirical results in Section 1.5.1 support the model’s prediction that in-
creased nominal volatility as measured by inflation volatility should reduce the ratio
of multinational sales as a fraction of total foreign sales. Yet the results for exchange
rate volatility go in the opposite direction, if anything. The model does imply that
nominal volatility affects the firm’s choice through the exchange rate, and as inflation
volatility rises so should exchange rate volatility. This is not necessarily inconsistent
with the empirical evidence, however.
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) provide empirical evidence supporting the notion
that a contractionary monetary policy shock appreciates the U.S. dollar relative to
various foreign currencies.18 While based on U.S. monetary policy, this evidence is
consistent with the model’s mechanism that a foreign monetary contraction will lead
to a foreign nominal exchange rate appreciation.
Exchange rates are not driven entirely by any one shock, however. Another under-
lying source of exchange rate fluctuations could have the opposite effect on exporting
or multinational firms’ profits through another channel. Exchange rate volatility may
also affect firms if the firm itself is risk averse.19 Because exchange rate volatility is
not robustly significant in the preferred specifications, I do not explicitly model the
potential effects of risk aversion on this channel. My results do suggest, however, that
one should not conflate the nominal volatility of the sort modeled in this paper with
nominal exchange rate volatility.
1.6 Conclusion
International trade theory has recently made significant progress in modeling the
endogenous choice of how to serve a foreign market. Yet the standard static consid-
erations are only part of a firm’s consideration; this paper contributes to this growing
17If I run pooled regression (3) using only those observations with non-zero exports and non-zero
multinational sales, I obtain a point estimate for the effects of inflation volatility on the fraction of
multinational production relative to total foreign sales of -4.19 significant at the 10% level.
18Landry (2009) provides more recent evidence.
19Examples of this include Cushman (1985) and Goldberg and Kolstad (1995).
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literature by considering how nominal uncertainty affects this choice. This is of par-
ticular policy relevance since inflation volatility is commonly seen as something that
can be tamed by modern monetary policy.
I show how in a general equilibrium model where exports are priced in the pro-
ducer’s currency and multinational production is priced in the local currency, an
increase in foreign nominal volatility decreases the fraction of foreign sales coming
from multinational production. Using bilateral, multi-sector trade and multinational
sales from the U.S., I find support for this result in the data.
The model predicts that if the country’s exports are LCP, then volatility will not
matter. As more data becomes available about the activity of multinationals, this
can be tested by examining the export and multinational behavior of other countries.
Future work should also incorporate vertical production as well as horizontal produc-
tion, to generate predictions which better match the available trade and multinational
sales data. The data suggest that future empirical studies of the effects of volatility
on trade or foreign investment should distinguish between exchange rate volatility in
general and other forms of uncertainty such as inflation volatility.
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1.7 Technical appendix
1.7.1 Derivation of St





Q(st+1|st)B(st+1) +Mt = Mt−1 +WtLt +B(st) + Πt + Tt.
where Πt are profits from domestic firms and Tt are lump-sum transfers of seignior-
age revenues from the government. As standard in the literature, st denotes the state
of the world (including the history up to time t), and is used to construct a complete
set of securities B(st+1).
The first order conditions are then very standard,20 with Lagrange multiplier λt :
Ct : UC(·) = λtPt
Lt : UL(·) + λtWt = 0
Mt : UM(·) + βEt(λt+1) = λt
Bt+1 : Q(s
t+1|st)λt = Et(βλt+1).
Using the first order condition for bond holdings, one obtains the expression for the
stochastic discount factor:
Q(st+1|st)λt = βEtλt+1







The utility function has real money balances in logs, yielding an exact log-linear
solution as shown by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998).
20For notational convenience, I omit explicitly writing out the probability of transitioning from
state st to st+1.
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Starting with the Mt first order condition:






























































































































































With complete markets, the exchange rate is solved by equating the price of state-
contingent bonds Q(st+1|st) and iterating backward. Chari et al. (2002) provide a
22





































































1.7.2 Proof of proposition I.1




























































where NMP,t is the fraction of the unit mass of home firms which produce abroad, and
NX,t is the fraction which export. To show that nominal uncertainty does not affect
this intensive margin, it is necessary to demonstrate that the average productivities
φ̃X and φ̃MP are themselves unaffected by nominal uncertainty. In addition, the ratio
of firm masses must also be unaffected by nominal uncertainty.
To derive expressions for these average productivities, consider imposing the com-
mon assumption that firm productivities follow a Pareto distribution with parameter
k. Previous work, including Helpman et al. (2004), has found that the Pareto dis-
tribution captures well the distribution of firm sizes seen in the data. Recall that if
the minimum productivity of any firm is normalized to be 1, the PDF of the Pareto
distribution is g(φ) = kφ−k−1 and the corresponding CDF is G(φ) = 1− φk.
Above we showed that φ̂MP/φ̂X is a constant. Let γX be the value of this ratio.
Now we seek to prove that if γX is constant, then φ̃X/φ̃MP is also constant.
As is now common in the literature, it is straightforward to show that the average
multinational productivity depends only on the elasticity of substitution θ, the shape
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is also constant with respect to nominal uncertainty.


























That is, nominal uncertainty does not affect the relative extensive margin φ̂MP/φ̂X ,
or the relative mass of firms NMP,t/NX,t. Thus, it does not affect the relative intensive
margin ỹH,MP,t/ỹH,X,t.
1.7.3 Numerical solution
The model with PCP exports no tractable analytical solutions for the stochastic
steady state. Instead, I employ numerical techniques to characterize the equilibrium.
The basic premise is to discretize the exogenous, stochastic variable (M∗), and solve
the model such that the pricing, cutoff, and equilibrium conditions hold in every state
of the economy. That is, the expectations are solved by discretizing the exogenous
process with quadrature methods. Since the export choice and pricing decisions are
made one period in advance, the equilibrium need only be solved for period t given
conditions in t− 1.
M∗ is discretized with Gaussian quadrature methods using 30 nodes. Then, using
numerical search over φ̂H , φ̂X , φ̂MP , pH , pH,PCP , pH,X , I calculate the other endoge-
nous variables.21 The numerical algorithm iterates until the following equilibrium
conditions hold:
21The model can be solved for one country without calculating the endogenous variables of the
other country, saving substantial numerical search space. In practice, for notational convenience, I
solve the model discretizing M and solving for foreign firms serving the home market. To match the
exposition in the paper, however, I provide the equilibrium conditions for the symmetric case here.
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22Note that dt =
St−1
St




Table 1.1: Model parameters
β 0.96 Annual discount rate
ρ 2 Standard risk-aversion
θ 5 Elasticity of substitution
k θ + 0.1 Pareto shape parameter
τ 1.2 20% iceberg trade cost
fX = f 0.035 Fixed cost of local firms and exporters
fMP 1 60% of foreign sales from multinationals
Table 1.2: The response of trade and multinational sales to inflation volatility
(1) (2) (3)
Inflation Volatility -15.79** -15.42*** -16.14***
(5.927) (5.096) (4.908)
Exchange Rate Volatility 2.156 1.903
(1.492) (1.271)




US Border -0.174*** -0.0170
(0.0401) (0.0642)




Industry dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 2,809 2,809 2,525
R-squared 0.294 0.382 0.397
Notes: The dependent variable is sales/(sales + exports). ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, standard errors clustered by coun-
try in parentheses
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Table 1.3: Total multinational sales as a fraction of total multinational sales and
exports, by industry
Industry Inflation volatility Exrate volatility Obs.
Information -9.36* 0.85** 329
Manufacturing (chemical) -4.12 2.78 349
Manufacturing (computers) -11.88 0.18 310
Manufacturing (electrical) -32.77** 3.10 303
Manufacturing (food) -29.46** 0.96 326
Manufacturing (machinery) -14.27* 1.81 317
Manufacturing (metals) -10.78 3.09 300
Manufacturing (transportation) -32.29** 4.34 301
Mining 16.52 0.62 274
Notes: The dependent variable is sales/(sales + exports). Inflation level, U.S.
border, OECD, year dummies included in all regressions. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1, clustered by country
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Table 1.4: Robustness exercises of pooled regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
sales/(sales + exports) ln(sales/exports)
Inflation Volatility -17.09*** -12.64** -14.71*** -12.64*** 8.275 -9.913
(3.533) (5.604) (3.645) (3.628) (27.25) (27.55)
Exchange Rate Volatility 2.660* 1.074 2.251* 1.074*** 17.99*** 21.09***
(1.426) (0.923) (1.288) (0.303) (6.338) (5.422)
Real GDP Volatility -6.811** -0.904 -6.811** -27.04 -7.971
(3.289) (1.546) (2.355) (20.48) (8.837)
Inflation Level -0.424 8.396 2.258 8.396* 18.74 -53.56***
(4.088) (5.489) (4.542) (4.489) (43.23) (17.45)
OECD 0.151*** 0.0896 0.0635 0.0896** 0.503 0.223
(0.0464) (0.0786) (0.0742) (0.0360) (0.462) (0.412)
US Border -0.155*** -0.0289 -0.00770 -0.0289 -1.797*** -1.752***
(0.0384) (0.111) (0.110) (0.106) (0.566) (0.547)
ln (real GDP per capita) 0.0286 0.0314 0.0286 0.0851 0.0752
(0.0254) (0.0238) (0.0207) (0.124) (0.128)
ln (distance) 0.0851 0.0775 0.0851 -0.372 -0.513
(0.0667) (0.0689) (0.0471) (0.372) (0.364)
Common Language 0.0270 -0.0213 0.0270 0.157 -0.0367
(0.0572) (0.0628) (0.0213) (0.311) (0.314)
Former Colony 0.0339 0.107 0.0339 0.0595 0.380
(0.0656) (0.0768) (0.0448) (0.333) (0.418)
Currency Union -0.0282 -0.153** -0.0282 -1.064** -1.773***
(0.0671) (0.0614) (0.0494) (0.408) (0.352)
Landlocked 0.0515 0.0597 0.0515 0.248 0.373
(0.0573) (0.0624) (0.0542) (0.336) (0.403)
Observations 3,159 2,525 2,875 2,525 2,162 2,458
R-squared 0.379 0.426 0.408 0.426 0.564 0.540
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Drop crisis countries no yes no yes yes no
Clustered by country country country industry country country
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1.1: Domestic, export, and FDI cutoffs before (dotted) and after (solid) an
increase in foreign nominal volatility
The dotted line and solid line depict the first and sec-
ond steady states, respectively. The second steady
state represents a higher foreign volatility.
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Figure 1.2: Convexity of the exporter profit function














Figure 1.3: Expected profit for an example firm

























Figure 1.4: The extensive margin of exporters and multinationals



























Figure 1.5: Quantity sales by exporters and multinationals
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Figure 1.6: The fraction of total foreign sales from multinationals
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Figure 1.8: The distribution of multinational sales as a fraction of total foreign sales,


























Table 1.5 lists the sources of the variables used in the estimation procedure. Table
1.6 provide summary statistics for each variable.
Table 1.5: Data sources
Variable description Source
Sales by majority-owned foreign affili-
ates of U.S. multinational firms
Bureau of Economic Analysis
Exports by major industry USITC
Inflation (∆ ln CPI), nominal exchange
rate
IMF International Financial Statistics
Real GDP per capita, distance, com-
mon language, colony, currency union,
landlocked
Rose (2005)
Table 1.6: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
sales/(sales + exports) 3485 0.581 0.35 0 1
ln(sales/exports) 2962 1.095 2.53 -7.516 13.016
Inflation Volatility 3159 0.005 0.00 0.001 0.039
Inflation Level 3159 0.004 0.01 -0.003 0.044
Exchange Rate Volatility 3485 0.019 0.02 0 0.225
Landlocked 3225 0.064 0.25 0 1
Common Language 3225 0.336 0.47 0 1
Colony 3225 0.044 0.20 0 1
Currency Union 3225 0.018 0.13 0 1
Log Distance 3225 8.501 0.50 6.981 9.154
ln(real GDP per capita) 3458 9.009 1.25 5.883 10.936
Real GDP Volatility 3485 0.019 0.02 0.004 0.087
Crisis 3485 0.100 0.30 0 1
OECD 3485 0.446 0.50 0 1
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CHAPTER II
Trade Flows, Menu Costs, and Exchange Rate
Volatility
2.1 Introduction
Our understanding of international price setting has dramatically expanded in
recent years with the availability of micro price data. This data has led to a class of
models designed to replicate the patterns seen in that transaction-level data. In this
paper, I test the trade flow implications of those models to see if the primary frictions
that are thought to be responsible for pricing behavior also help to understand trade
values themselves. The benchmark model is an industry-level analysis where firms set
prices while faced with exchange rate shocks, productivity shocks, and menu costs.
This model is capable of fitting these price-setting facts well, so I contrast its trade
flow behavior against flexible price and time-dependent (Calvo) alternatives. I find
that matching the price behavior does little to improve the model’s performance for
trade flows.
Recent work by Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) uses firm- and product-level micro
data to analyze the price-setting behavior of U.S. imports and exports. A principal
finding is significant heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustment and substan-
tial price stickiness with durations of about one year on average. In follow up work,
Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) find that a menu cost model is capable of fitting the
observed long-run pass-through of exchange rates to prices well. In a related pa-
per, Gopinath et al. (2010) find that strategic complementarities are important for
understanding the choice of local currency pricing in U.S. imports.
This work, however, does not directly address trade flows themselves. Gust, Leduc
and Sheets (2009) examine the impact of low exchange-rate pass-through with a focus
on the trade balance. They find, in the context of their DSGE model, that changes
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in pass-through do not significantly affect external adjustment. Their model uses
variable markups and Calvo-style price setting. In this paper, I focus on imports and
exports separately using menu costs in the benchmark model. I compare the results
of this model against disaggregated, short-run trade data.
In the closed economy literature, the primary purpose behind understanding high
frequency price setting is to understand the implications of nominal shocks on real ac-
tivity. Correctly measuring these nominal shocks and their implications on aggregate
real variables is the focus of a truly enormous literature. Studying the closed economy
is hampered by difficulties in identification of monetary shocks and a limited amount
of high-frequency domestic production data. In an open economy, on the other hand,
we have very volatile, well-measured exchange rate movements and relatively good
data about trade flows. I use these advantages to better understand both the price
and quantity implications of modern models of firm behavior.
This paper sets up an industry-level analysis of trade in an environment where
firms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks and exchange rate shocks. I examine the
implications of state-dependent pricing (menu costs) versus time-dependent (Calvo)
and flexible price alternatives and examine their trade flow implications under a
variety of settings. I show quantitatively how strategic complementarity in price
setting in the model affects trade flows and compare those responses to the data. I
use disaggregated, quarterly, bilateral trade data with the U.S. to better understand
the short-run dynamics of U.S. imports and exports to exchange rate changes. I also
use sectoral heterogeneity of these effects to shed light on the underlying mechanisms
in the model.
After setting up the model, I compare the numerical results to those found in the
data. The first results take average (pooled) magnitude responses of trade flows to
exchange rate changes. Using a large sample of disaggregated industries and partner
countries, I find that U.S. imports are basically unresponsive to exchange rate changes;
if anything, imports actually fall slightly in response to an exchange rate appreciation.
Exports are more responsive in the expected direction, but far too weak relative to the
models considered. Moreover, while increasing the impact of price stickiness makes
the import result better, it makes the export result worse. Thus, this class of models
is unable to simultaneously match both price and trade facts.
To further examine these results, I consider the comparative statics implied by the
model and compare it to those estimated from the disaggregated sector-level data.
The first is price duration, since some industries are characterized by flexibly priced
goods while others have sticky prices. I find almost no difference between sectors
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split into groups based on their price duration. This is in contrast to the model,
where such large changes in price stickiness via menu costs imply larger differences in
the response of trade flows. Second, I use elasticities of substitution estimated from
medium-run data; again, the differences in the response of these sectors in the data
are fairly small, yet the model implies large changes. This suggests that neither price
stickiness nor “true” elasticity are well-suited to explaining the sectoral heterogeneity
in the data.
I conduct two further exercises as a check on the results based off of price dura-
tion and medium-run elasticities. One is to use the different price-setting behavior
of sectors as classified by Rauch (1999), where some sectors are traded on organized
exchanges, others have reference prices, and some are more differentiated. More dif-
ferentiated sectors should generally correspond with lower elasticities of substitution
and stickier prices. Again, I find relatively little difference in the import and ex-
port behavior of these three types of sector, with the model actually implying the
wrong comparative static in the case of imports. Finally, I examine durable versus
non-durable goods. Chapter III shows how this distinction is important for under-
standing the elasticity of trade with respect to output, and there is reason to believe
it might affect the elasticity with respect to prices (though the sign is unclear). Here
too I find relatively little difference in the import and export responses. This implies
that either the forces affecting durable versus non-durable are small or that they
cancel each other out.
I conclude with a discussion of possible mechanisms which might help to explain
these results. While the pooled results are related to the classic elasticity puzzle
described in Ruhl (2008), matching the comparative statics across industries presents
an additional hurdle which cannot be resolved by simply assuming implausibly low
elasticities of substitution.
2.2 Model setup
The benchmark model of this paper is a partial equilibrium analysis of a monopo-
listically competitive industry. This level of aggregation is common in the menu cost
literature, among others (see e.g. Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan 2010b). The
(real) exchange rate process is taken to be exogenous, which is generally a reasonable
assumption given the relative lack of connection between movements in the exchange
rate and underlying fundamentals, especially at higher frequencies. The basic setup
of the model follows closely that of Gopinath et al. (2010), but similar models can be
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found in Schoenle (2010) and Neiman (2011). Generally speaking, this class of models
is considered to be capable of reproducing the basic known facts about international
pricing and exchange rate pass-through.
A large number of foreign firms compete monopolistically in the home industry.
Firms set their prices in advance, given an idiosyncratic process for the menu costs
it faces in the future.1 Firms produce with only labor supplied with an exogenous
wage.
2.2.1 Demand
The heart of the model is the demand a firm faces for its product given prevailing
economic conditions.
Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) is the standard demand setup for models
of monopolistic competition, which provides very tractable demand equations depend-
ing only on the firm’s price pi in the home currency, the aggregate price index P , and







where θ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. This leads to the opti-
mal, flexible price charged by a firm to be a constant markup θ/(θ− 1) over marginal
cost.
In recent work, Gopinath et al. (2010) and Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) find
that variable markups are important in producing the low exchange rate pass-through
observed in micro trade price data. Typical explanations – nominal rigidity in the
short run and local distribution costs – cannot explain the observation that individual
import prices at the dock do not pass-through changes in the exchange rate, even after
adjusting.
This variable markup can be generated from micro sources,2 but it is often con-
venient to characterize them in a way consistent with the formulation in Kimball
(1995). Klenow and Willis (2006) provide one such aggregator, which in its approx-








1This structure nests two special cases: flexible prices simply set the menu costs to zero, while
time-dependent Calvo-style pricing involves an arbitrarily high menu cost with some probability,
otherwise it faces no menu cost.
2See, e.g. Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
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where ε is the “super-elasticity” controlling the variable markup and P is approx-
imately a geometric average of industry prices. As ε → 0, the demand specification
collapses to CES. As pi → P , the elasticity returns to the constant markup.3
2.2.2 The firm’s problem
All three price-setting formulations can be characterized by the same set of Bell-
man equations. Let V a(p, e, a) denote the value of the firm with price p, exchange
rate e, and productivity a. V n is the value if the firm does not adjust its price. A
firm pays fmc to change its price, it earns profit π(p, e, a). The Bellman equations
can be characterized as:
V a(p, e, a) = max
p
π(p, e, a)− efmcpq + βE[max{V a(p′, e′, a′), V n(p′, e′, a′)}]}], (2.1)
V n(p, e, a) = π(p, e, a) + βE[max{V a(p′, e′, a′), V n(p′, e′, a′)}]. (2.2)
where β is a constant discount rate and primes denote the future period. The value of
the firm at any time is simply max{V a, V n}. Flow profit in each period is π(p, e, a) =
pq− qeφ/a for a firm which sets its price in its own currency (producer cost pricing),
and φ denotes the degree to which costs are in the foreign currency. This captures a
degree of vertical production using intermediate goods or foreign labor to produce a
good for a particular market. If on the other hand a firm prices its products in the
foreign currency, the local currency priced (LCP) profit is π(p, e, a) = epq − qeφ/a.
This formulation can in principle embed all three price setting types: with flexible
prices fmc = 0 and V = V
a, and with menu costs firms choose between V a and V n
each period. With Calvo-style price setting, fmc takes an arbitrarily high value with
probability ψ, and a value of 0 with probability 1− ψ.
The exchange rate is exogenous and assumed to follow a persistent AR(1) process:
ln e′ = ρe ln e+ εe.
Similarly, for each firm the idiosyncratic productivity follows an AR(1) process:
ln a′i = ρa ln ai + εa,i.
Given that demand y depends on the relative price of a good to the overall price
3With trade costs, this specification seems to imply that the markup for foreign firms would
permanently differ from the markup for domestic firms.
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index P , firms must know its expected evolution. In principle, this could be deter-
mined as the result of an additional fixed point problem.4 For tractability, I follow
Gopinath et al. (2010) and assume that the price index follows a known, calibrated
path:
lnP ′ = α lnP + (1− α) ln P̄ + (1− α)φ̄ ln e.
where P̄ is the steady state price level θ/(θ − 1), and φ̄ controls the degree to which
the exchange rate passes through to the overall price index. This parameter would
be endogenized in a more fully specified model.
2.2.3 Calibration
Table 2.1 provides the benchmark calibration. I follow Gopinath et al. (2010) for
the benchmark which they use to match import price dynamics. Generally speaking,
this model and these parameters are capable of roughly matching low exchange rate
pass-through, infrequent price changes, the size of price changes, and the autocorre-
lation of new prices.
For imports, prices are set in the destination currency, reflecting the prevailing
local currency pricing observed in U.S. data. For exports, prices are set in the ex-
porter’s currency, again reflecting U.S. data. This asymmetry leads sticky prices to
have significantly different effects on imports and exports, as seen later.
2.2.4 Solution strategy
The numerical model is solved by discretizing the state space and employing value
function iteration to solve for (2.1) and (2.2). Once the value function converges, I
solve for the policy function. Then a model economy is simulated for a large number
of firms (1000) over a long horizon (10000 months). The computational details of the
solution strategy can be found in the appendix. All firms face the same aggregate
exchange rate shocks but have independent idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Price
change statistics like the mean, median, variance, and frequency are calculated from
this data.
This simulated trade data is then aggregated to a single sector at a quarterly
frequency and estimated similarly to (2.3), discussed below.5 The resulting impulse
responses can then be plotted alongside the impulse responses estimated from the
data.
4This is the approach of Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010).
5Aggregate GDP is held constant and assumed to be independent of the exchange rate shocks.
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2.3 Data
Given that price stickiness is on the order of one year (Gopinath and Rigobon
2008), higher frequency data is required to understand the implications of pricing
on the dynamic response of trade flows. Since these newly-available price facts are
derived from U.S. imports and exports, it makes sense to focus on these disaggregated
trade flows. Unlike price data, which is sampled by the BLS and only available for a
few large bilateral groups (e.g. Near East Asia), the Census records the universe of
bilateral trade at a disaggregated frequency.6 The bilateral nature of the data allows
exploitation of cross-country heterogeneity in exchange rate movements, rather than
average trade-weighted changes in the exchange rate.
Trade Data
The most comprehensive data is available back to 1989, which forms the begin-
ning of the analysis. I focus on bilateral pairs which are members of the OECD.
These comprise the largest trading partners (e.g. Canada, Mexico, Japan, the UK,
Germany, France, etc.) with the obvious exception of China. Focusing on relatively
developed countries also emphasizes the presumably substitutable nature of these
(largely manufactured) goods.
The trade data used in this paper are comprised of two separate classification
systems: harmonized system (HS) 4-digit categories and NAICS 6-digit categories.
There are over 1200 distinct HS4 categories and over 400 distinct NAICS6 categories.
This data is mapped to various sector-level classifications discussed below.
Elasticity of substitution
The elasticity of substitution is a crucial parameter of the model, regardless of
other underlying price-setting frictions. The focus of this paper is essentially on
the short-run elasticity of trade values to exchange rate changes, which is generally
influenced by short-run price-setting frictions. Yet a sector’s structural elasticity is
perhaps better captured by more medium run data, and one such estimation strategy
can be found in Broda and Weinstein (2006a). I use these estimates to classify HS4
categories into “high”, “medium”, and “low” elasticities. Grouping elasticities into
bins allows for a large number of sectors to be averaged into estimating each set of
impulse responses. In addition, it does not depend on precise estimates of the medium
run elasticities, instead using the estimates only to establish a ranking.
6The underlying confidential micro-data identifies the country of origin/destination, but the data
is still insufficiently detailed to construct reliable price indices for each bilateral pair.
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Price duration
Recent analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics micro data on U.S. import and export
prices by Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) reveals substantial sectoral heterogeneity in
the duration of prices.7 The duration of prices ranges from 1 month (the unit of
observation) to 24.3 months, but their listing does not encompass all of goods trade.8
Still, the model has significant implications for price durations over this range, so I
match the trade data to the most disaggregated 2- or 4-digit classification provided
by Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) for this exercise.
Pricing classification
The model, like most models of price setting behavior, is built around monopolis-
tically competitive firms. The degree to which a firm can price set is dependent on its
product, however. Rauch (1999) classifies goods into three categories: goods traded
on an organized exchange (homogeneous goods), goods for which a published “ref-
erence price” is available, and differentiated goods. Clearly, sticky prices with lower
elasticities of substitution are likely to be found in the last group. We should expect
the first two groups to have relatively more flexible prices and higher elasticities of
substitution.
Durability
Alternatively, consumer demand may respond differently to price changes based
on whether they consume it as a non-durable or hold a stock of it as a durable.
While the model does not speak directly to how durable goods might be different, a
number of scenarios are plausible. First, durable goods consist of larger goods, for
which consumers may be making more deliberate, discrete purchasing choices. When
buying an automobile, for example, price is an important consideration between a car
produced in Japan and Germany. A change between the relative exchange rates of
the yen and euro that filters into dollar prices would lead consumers on the margin
to switch their purchases relatively freely. A second possibility is that a potential car
buyer has some ability to re-time her purchase if pricing is currently unfavorable. On
the flip side, durable goods tend to be more complex and require several stages of
production. Since trade largely consists of intermediate goods, a car manufacturer
might be stuck with a specific supplier of a car part in the short run; either the buyer
7They point out, however, that there is more heterogeneity of price duration within sectors than
between.
8This is likely due to confidentiality of the underlying data as well as the use of sampling methods
for prices rather than a survey of all trade.
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or the seller would be exposed to the exchange rate change depending on the currency
of pricing, and it would not be feasible to quickly shift from a Japanese supplier to a
German or Canadian one.
In terms of the model, such considerations are essentially reduced down to changes
in the elasticity of substitution between varieties, with the caveat that the short run
elasticity may differ from the long run elasticity.
I use the same classification of durable goods as in chapter III. There, we cre-
ated a simple classification at the 3-digit NAICS level. Durable sectors include
23X (construction) and 325-339 (chemical, plastics, mineral, metal, machinery, com-
puter/electronic, transportation, and miscellaneous manufacturing). All other 1XX,
2XX, and 3XX NAICS categories are considered non-durable for this exercise.
Bilateral, disaggregated data allows the use of industry-time fixed effects, which
capture the industry-specific supply and demand changes occurring within the United
States and the world as a whole. In this way, the regressions can isolate the com-
mon effect on trade flows of different industries for an exchange rate change. The
substitutability implicit in the estimation strategy is between different foreign trad-
ing partners. It seems reasonable to think that goods within the same disaggregated
category from two different trading partners are fairly substitutable, rather than the
typical home versus foreign substitutability considered in many two-country interna-
tional macro models. This in turn will feed into what demand elasticity is reasonable
to assume in the numerical model analysis.
2.3.1 Estimation strategy
The estimation strategy takes five parts: pooled regressions to determine an “aver-
age” effect of exchange rate changes on imports and exports, and splitting the sample
according to classifications of the goods’ frequency of price changes, their medium-
run elasticity of substitution, their price-setting classification from Rauch (1999), and
whether they are durable or non-durable. The first exercise can be thought of as a
macro (albeit partial equilibrium) analysis of the average effects, while the other
exercises inform the comparative statics of the model presented in section 2.2.
The basic estimating equation for sector i, country j, at time t is:
∆ ln Tradeijt = β0 +
8∑
k=0
β1,k∆ ln ejt−k +
3∑
k=0
β2,k∆ ln yjt−k + Zijt + εijt, (2.3)
where y is the GDP volume of country j, and Z is a series of dummies (country and
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sector-time).9 The estimating equation follows the standard pass-through literature
as in Campa and Goldberg (2005), but applied to trade values. The exchange rate
variables have a long lag, acknowledging the possibility that given price stickiness and
possible strategic complementarity, exchange rate changes may take up to two years
to fully take effect. For imports, foreign income helps proxy for supply side effects.
For exports, foreign income plays a direct role proxying for changes in demand from
the business cycle.10
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Time-dependent pricing and the selection effect
First, I contrast the results of a state-dependent (menu cost) pricing model with
that of a time-dependent (Calvo) pricing model. The distinction will be very dramatic
in terms of the value of trade, a result that echos the results in the closed economy
literature.11 The central reasoning is also similar: a strong selection effect occurs
under menu cost pricing, where the firms that most need to adjust their price will;
with a fixed menu cost, this leads firms to generally not be far from their profit-
maximizing price.
I use a combination of the trade value data and the estimated results from the
models to help inform this distinction. I consider two extreme cases of the selection
effect: the fixed menu cost model where the selection effect is very strong, and a
Calvo pricing model where the selection effect is essentially eliminated. Modeling
techniques such as multi-product firms, stochastic menu costs, etc., which help reduce
the selection effect, can generally be seen as some combination of these extremes.
2.4.2 Pooled results
Consider the results of estimating (2.3) pooled across HS4 sectors. Rather than
presenting the regression results in table form, it is easier to consider the implied
9At this level of disaggregation, there are a significant number of zeros in the data set. Traditional
gravity equation estimations tend to drop these zeros, but this can lead to inconsistent estimates
as argued by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Since the estimating strategy here uses (log) differences, I
conduct robustness exercises using an alternative difference formula which explicitly allows for zero
observations; this follows from work in the labor literature (Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Miranda,
Foote and Nagypal 2006), and the log differences are replaced by 2
xij,t−xij,t−1
xij,t+xij,t−1
. The estimates are
generally similar to those with log differences. For ease of interpretation, I report log differences.
10While these proxies are not perfect, they are implied by most international business cycle models
as indicators of supply and demand changes.
11For a detailed discussion of this in a closed economy context, see Midrigan (2010).
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impulse responses for horizon h by calculating
∑h
k=0 β1,k. These impulse responses
are shown for a 1% exchange rate appreciation with 95% confidence bands12 in Figure
2.1 for imports and Figure 2.2 for exports.
First, notice that in the data, the response of imports is quite low, even negative for
the first two quarters. In the models, imports rise as the exchange rate appreciation
makes them relatively cheaper. With flexible prices, dollar-priced goods are adjusted
to be relatively cheaper and their demand rises immediately. In the menu cost model,
this reaction is not complete as some firms choose not to update their price right
away. In the Calvo model, firms slowly respond and when they do, the strategic
complementarities induce them not to respond fully as well. This combination implies
a very small response of trade flows, but quantitatively they are still positive and
significantly different from the data.
With exports, the response in the data is substantially stronger, almost half a
percent in the first quarter compared to a near-zero result for imports. The result is
also of the expected (negative) sign. Yet the models with producer-cost priced (PCP)
exports imply very strong results. Here, flexible prices fit the best, because the quick
response to the exchange rate change implies that the prices faced by foreigners did
not automatically rise because of the domestic exchange rate appreciation. The menu
cost model and Calvo models have dramatic responses because of this price stickiness.
In the data, however, export prices are more sticky than import or domestic prices
(Schoenle 2010). Clearly, these standard modeling techniques do not fit the trade
data well.
To shed light on the possible explanations and their plausibility, I use the disag-
gregated nature of the data to test the relevant comparative statics of the model.
2.4.3 Variation in duration
There is significant variation in price duration between HS sectors, as documented
by Gopinath and Rigobon (2008). I use this variation to break up the categories into
three “bins” of duration, short, medium, and long respectively. For imports, this
corresponds to durations of roughly 5, 12, and 17 months, while for exports this is
roughly 8, 14, and 20 months.
For a model comparison, I run the menu cost model under the baseline calibration
but vary the menu cost to obtain roughly comparable frequencies of price adjustment.
This corresponds to menu costs of 1%, 15%, and 25% of monthly revenues for imports
12These confidence bands are generated by asymptotic Wald-based tests of the of the summed
coefficients.
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and 2%, 25%, and 30% for exports. The results are plotted in Figure 2.3.
Clearly, the model performs poorly with this comparative static as well. For
imports, the initial response drops from about 1.2% to 0.5%, yet the estimated initial
impact hardly changes in terms of the point estimate. For exports, the initial response
rises from -2.6% to almost -4% in the model, yet the estimated response is also
basically unchanged by comparison.
With a menu cost model, however, duration is a function of nearly all parameters
of the model. This exercise suggests that the variation in duration might come from
heterogeneity in some other mechanism. Alternatively, some mechanism might shut
down the menu cost’s ability to affect the magnitude of trade flows. One obvious
mechanism is the elasticity of substitution. Yet as the next section shows, it is
unreasonable to assume low elasticities of substitution for all goods in this sample.
2.4.4 Variation in medium-run elasticity
The elasticity of substitution is obviously critical to the trade responses. Here,
price stickiness and strategic complementarity both affect pass-through of exchange
rate changes to prices; for imports, this mitigates the trade value response as seen
in Figure 2.1, yet price stickiness worsens the model’s ability to match the data,
seen in Figure 2.2. The baseline elasticity in these exercises was 5, a value used
commonly in the trade literature and also by Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010). The
international business cycle literature, by contrast, tends to use much lower values.
The latter literature tends to focus on aggregate trade, which Imbs and Mejean (2009)
argue can cause an aggregation bias in estimation of the elasticity of substitution. In
addition, disaggregated trade data allows for comparison across bins of sectors with
varying elasticities.
Therefore, I make use of the disaggregated elasticities estimated by Broda and
Weinstein (2006a) using medium-run data. These elasticities are generally in the
vicinity of those found in the trade literature. I aggregate the elasticities from the
HS10 level to the HS4 level by using medians.13 Like the duration bins, I split the
sample into three bins: low (average elasticity 1.9), medium (2.9), and high (11.3).
Thus, there is substantial heterogeneity at the HS4 level even when using medians
across HS10 categories and averages across bins of HS4 categories.
The results are plotted in Figure 2.4. The data shows little variation in the
13The data is very right-tailed, causing means to be relatively large. Using means will make the
models fit even more poorly. In addition, the data set from this paper is only available for imports,
so I assume that export elasticities are similar.
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response of imports by elasticity. The model, on the other hand, implies dramatic
changes. In addition, the model’s dynamics imply a reduction in trade over time as
firms choose to change their prices and the sectoral price responds to the exchange
rate.14
With exports, again there is little variation in the data between bins of sectors. Yet
the model’s changes are dramatic, as there is very high pass-through of exchange rate
changes, since prices are set in dollars. With higher elasticities of substitution, the
trade response is dramatic and unsupported by the data. Even with an elasticity of
1.9, in line with that used by macro models but with counterfactual price and markup
implications, the response is still 3-4 times too strong in the first two quarters.
2.4.5 Variation in pricing classification
Given that the model is one of sticky prices and monopolistically competitive firms,
it is important to understand if that pricing and market type really plays a significant
role in how imports and exports respond to exchange rates. Figure 2.5 plots estimated
impulse responses for three types of good, as defined by Rauch (1999). Organized
exchange goods are most homogeneous, with firms having little pricing power. Since
prices are set on organized exchanges, they exhibit little stickiness. Reference-priced
goods are those for which a published price for that type of good is available, separate
from a particular supplier. It might best be thought of as a type of good somewhere
in between homogeneous goods and differentiated goods. Finally, differentiated goods
are those most likely to have sticky prices and lower elasticities of substitution.
As the figure shows, there is little difference in the import response of the three
types of goods. If anything, differentiated goods look least like the impulse responses
of Figure 2.1. Exports, on the other hand, show a clearer pattern. The more dif-
ferentiated the good, the more negative and significant the response. Once again,
however, this is contrary to the prediction of the model with regard to the elasticity
of substitution. Highly differentiated goods should imply a low elasticity of substi-
tution, and thus a smaller response. On the other hand, Figure 2.2 shows that the
stickier the prices, the larger the response given producer cost pricing. To replicate
the pattern seen in the data, the exchange-traded and reference-priced goods must
have quite effective low elasticities of substitution, despite their relative homogeneity.
The greater response of differentiated goods could be the result of sticky prices with
an otherwise similarly low elasticity of substitution. Of course, economically such
low elasticities are contrary to the notion of homogeneous goods; this suggests that
14Recall that this sectoral price response is exogenously imposed.
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other frictions in the economy are dominating trade flows, and that these frictions
are important even for exchange-traded and reference-priced goods.
2.4.6 Variation in durability
Goods can also vary by their use, specifically, whether they are durable or non-
durable. Engel and Wang (2011) show how important durability can be in under-
standing trade movements over the business cycle; that is, durability strongly affects
the aggregate income elasticity through a composition effect. Yet durability might
also affect the elasticity of exchange rate changes as well; the more durable a good is,
the easier it is to intertemporally substitute its purchase. This intertemporal substi-
tution might be important if exchange rates are mean reverting, or if purchasers can
afford to take the time to substitute towards cheaper alternatives from other sources
(foreign or domestic).
To this end, I perform the estimation over NAICS trade categories, which cor-
respond to production industries reasonably suitable for being defined as durable or
non-durable. The results are plotted in Figure 2.6. The total results are very similar
to those found with HS4 sectors from section 2.4.2. For imports, non-durable sec-
tors appear to have a stronger price response than durable sectors, contrary to the
hypothesis. Both are small and often indistinguishable from zero, however. For ex-
ports, we see a slightly stronger response for durable goods than non-durable. There
is relatively little evidence that durability plays a significant role in influencing the
response of trade flows from exchange rate changes.
2.5 Conclusion
Using disaggregated sector-level, bilateral U.S. imports and exports, I test the
implications of new models of firm pricing when faced with nominal rigidities. Even
restricting the analysis to those goods which should be quite sensitive to exchange
rate changes – those with high long-run elasticities, low price durations, or durable
goods – the response is remarkably muted.
For imports, time-dependent pricing and strategic complementarities combined to
provide a remarkably low import response, even given a “true” elasticity of substi-
tution of five. On the other hand, the data show that imports if anything fall in
response to a U.S. exchange rate appreciation. The selection effect works in the op-
posite direction for U.S. exports, producing the strongest trade responses given that
U.S. exports are priced in dollars.
49
While there is clear heterogeneity in both the long-run elasticity and the price
duration of goods across sectors, these translate into rather mild differences in their
trade responses to exchange rate changes. Furthermore, sectors with very different
pricing schemes and degrees of differentiation have fairly similar trade responses.
Finally, there is little distinction between the trade responses of durable and non-
durable goods.
The model is not yet capable of lessening trade responses to exchange rates suf-
ficiently without assuming that even the highly-substitutable goods identified in the
sample have a fairly low elasticity in the model. Further work is required to identify
the pricing mechanisms which might dampen this response without resorting to a
low structural elasticity. Modern international macro models like Engel and Wang
(2011) simply assume a fixed cost of adjustment of trade flows, like that of capital.
While such a modeling mechanism can improve the fit of aggregated models, it is
unappealing without understanding the precise mechanisms involved. Possibilities
include distribution contracts, firm-specific production, search costs to find new sup-
pliers, and time to ship. Ideally, such mechanisms are tested not only via models
and aggregate data but explicitly tested by using disaggregated data and the large
heterogeneity between sectors and even firms. I believe this is a fruitful direction for
future work.
2.6 Computational algorithm
The computational model in section 2.2 is solved via discretization of the state
space and value function iteration for each set of calibrated parameters.15 The basic
solution method is similar to Gopinath et al. (2010).16 The (log) sectoral price level
is centered around the steady state markup θ/(θ − 1), with 81 grid points used for
the individual firm price, 75 for the sectoral price level, 31 for the exchange rate,
and 15 for the idiosyncratic productivity. The AR(1) processes for the exchange rate
and productivity have grid points and transition matrices calculated with the method
described in Adda and Cooper (2003).
The demand function defined by Klenow and Willis (2006) has the potential to
15I also experimented with collocation methods, but the value functions were not well approxi-
mated by the commonly-used Chebyshev polynomials, requiring spline interpolation; the computa-
tional speed was substantially slower than the more common discretization method with relatively
few benefits in numerical precision.
16I thank Gita Gopinath and Oleg Itskhoki for making their model’s code available for comparison.
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be negative for a sufficiently large real price, so I follow Gopinath et al. (2010) and
set demand to be nil if the price is sufficiently high. Profits are denominated and
maximized in the exporter’s currency.
Once the value function converges and the policy function is derived, the sim-
ulation begins at the steady state with 1000 period burn-in. The remaining 9000
periods for 1000 firms forms the basis of the statistical analysis for each given cali-
bration. The simulated data is aggregated to a quarterly frequency in order to match
the data used in the estimation procedure using actual trade data. The sector-level
trade values are simple averages over the 1000 firms, the result of the implicit cost
minimization problem in CES aggregation. Given the large number of periods, the
model’s implied impulse responses are estimated fairly precisely.
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Table 2.1: Model parameters
β 0.941/12 Monthly discount rate
θ 5 Elasticity of substitution
φ̄ 0.5 Exchange rate pass-through to sectoral price level
α 0.93 Autocorrelation of sectoral price level
φ 0.75 25% of production costs in foreign currency
ε 3 Super-elasticity of demand for KW demand
ρa 0.95 Persistence of idiosyncratic shocks
ρe 0.99 Persistence of exchange rate shocks
σa 0.08 Std. dev. of idiosyncratic shocks
σe 0.025 Std. dev. of exchange rate shocks
Figure 2.1: Impulse responses for pooled import HS4 categories with baseline model
results
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Figure 2.2: Impulse responses for pooled export HS4 categories with baseline model
results
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Figure 2.3: Impulse responses by duration bins (solid), and the menu cost model IRF
(with markers)
Imports Exports










































































Figure 2.4: Impulse responses by elasticity bins (solid), and the menu cost model IRF
(with markers)
Imports Exports











































































Figure 2.5: Impulse responses by pricing type
Imports Exports








































































Figure 2.6: Impulse responses for NAICS categories, total and split into durable and
non-durable







































































The Collapse of International Trade During the
2008-2009 Crisis: In Search of the Smoking Gun1
3.1 Introduction
A remarkable feature of the recent crisis is the collapse in international trade.
This collapse is global in nature (WTO 2009), and dramatic in magnitude. To give
one example, while U.S. GDP has declined by 3.8% from its peak to the current
trough, real U.S. imports fell by 21.4% and real exports fell by 18.9% over the same
period. Though protectionist pressures inevitably increased over the course of the
recent crisis, it is widely believed that the collapse is not due to newly erected trade
barriers (Baldwin and Evenett 2009).
While these broad facts are well known, we currently lack both a nuanced empirical
understanding of the patterns and a successful economic explanation for them. This
paper has three main parts. The first uses high-frequency (quarterly and monthly)
foreign trade data for the United States to document the patterns of collapse at a
disaggregated level. We focus on the U.S. in part due to its central role in the global
downturn and because it offers up-to-date, detailed monthly data. The second part
uses data on domestic absorption, domestic price levels, as well as quantities and
prices of imports to perform a simple “trade wedge” exercise in the spirit of Cole
and Ohanian (2002) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007). It allows us to assess
whether the evolution of trade volumes is in line with the overall domestic demand
and relative prices. Finally, the third part uses monthly sector-level data to examine a
range of potential explanations for the trade collapse proposed in the policy literature.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. The recent collapse in inter-
1This chapter is joint work with Andrei Levchenko and Linda Tesar. A slightly shorter version
is published in the IMF Economic Review, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Dec. 2010), pp. 214-253.
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national trade is indeed exceptional by historical standards. Relative to economic
activity, the drop in trade is an order of magnitude larger than what was observed
in the previous postwar recessions, with the exception of 2001. The collapse appears
to be broad-based across trading partners: trade with virtually all parts of the world
fell by double digits. Across sectors, the sharpest percentage drops in trade are in
automobiles, durable industrial supplies and capital goods. Those categories also
account for most of the absolute decrease in trade. Another way to assess whether
the recent trade collapse is exceptional is to use information on prices and examine
the wedges. The time series behavior of the international trade wedge exhibits a
drastic deviation from the norm during the recent episode. In the second quarter of
2009, the overall trade wedge has reached −40%, revealing a collapse in trade well
in excess of what is predicted by the pace of economic activity and prices. This is
indeed exceptional: over the past 25 years the mean value of the wedge is only 1.6%,
with a standard deviation of 6.6%. We conclude from this exercise that the recent
trade collapse does represent a puzzle, in the sense that any import demand function
derived from a standard international real business cycle model would predict a far
smaller drop in imports given observed overall economic activity and prices.2 Finally,
using detailed trade data, we shed light on which explanations are consistent with
cross-sectoral variation in trade flow changes. We find strong support for the role
of vertical linkages, as well as for compositional effects. Sectors that are used inten-
sively as intermediate inputs, and those with greater reductions in domestic output
experienced significantly greater reductions in trade, after controlling for a variety
of other sectoral characteristics. By contrast, trade credit does not appear to play a
significant role: more trade credit-intensive sectors did not experience greater trade
flow reductions.
We begin by presenting a comprehensive set of stylized facts about the trade col-
lapse, across time, sectors, and destination countries, as well as separating movements
in prices and quantities to examine whether the fall is mainly real or nominal. Mov-
ing beyond the stylized facts, our next goal is to establish whether the collapse in
trade is indeed “extraordinary” relative to what we should expect. In order to do
that, we need a benchmark. The starting point of the second exercise is the canonical
2Chinn (2009) estimates an econometric model of U.S. exports, and shows that the recent level
of exports is far below what would be predicted by the model. Freund (2009) analyzes the behavior
of trade in previous global downturns, and shows that the elasticity of trade to GDP has increased
in recent decades, predicting a reduction in global trade in the current downturn of about 15%. Our
methodology looks at U.S. imports rather than U.S. or global exports, and takes explicit account of
domestic and import prices at the quarterly frequency.
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international real business cycle model of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995). It as-
sumes that domestic agents value a CES aggregate of domestic and foreign varieties
in a particular sector – a common feature of virtually every model in international
macroeconomics. In this setup, we derive an import demand equation that expresses
the total imports as a function of the overall domestic absorption, domestic prices,
and import prices. The “trade wedge” is then defined as the deviation between actual
imports and the imports as implied by these variables. Using this simple optimality
condition allows us to explore two questions: first, is the recent trade collapse truly a
puzzle? That is, the wedge exercise that accounts for both domestic and foreign prices
and quantities is the appropriate benchmark to evaluate whether the recent decrease
in international trade is in any sense extraordinary. Second, by pitting against the
data conditions that would have to hold period-by-period in virtually any quantita-
tive model of international transmission, we can offer a preliminary view on whether
– and which – DSGE models can have some hope of matching the magnitude of the
recent collapse in international trade.
The analysis of wedges indeed reveals a large shortfall in imports relative to what
would be expected based on the pace of economic activity and relative prices. In the
third exercise, we use highly disaggregated trade data to test a series of hypotheses
about the nature of the trade collapse. We record the percentage changes in exports
and imports during the crisis at the 6-digit NAICS level of disaggregation (about 450
distinct sectors), and relate the variation in these changes to sectoral characteristics
that would proxy for the leading explanations. The first is that trade may be col-
lapsing because of the transmission of shocks through vertical production linkages.
When there is a drop in final output, the demand for intermediate inputs will suffer,
leading to a more than proportional drop in trade flows.3 To test for this possibility,
we build several measures of intermediate input linkages at the detailed sector level
based on the U.S. Input-Output tables, as well as measures of production sharing
based on data on exports and imports within multinational firms. The second ex-
planation we evaluate is trade credit: if during the recent crisis, firms in the U.S.
are less willing to extend trade credit to partners abroad, trade may be disrupted.4
3Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) and Yi (2003) document the dramatic growth in vertical trade in
recent decades, and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) demonstrate that greater sector-level vertical
linkages play a role in the transmission of shocks between countries.
4Raddatz (2011) shows that there is greater comovement between sectors that have stronger
trade credit links, while Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) demonstrate that in countries experiencing
banking crises, export fell systematically more in financially dependent industries. Amiti and We-
instein (2009) show that exports by Japanese firms in the 1990s declined when the bank commonly
recognized as providing trade finance to the firm was in distress.
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We therefore use U.S. firm-level data to construct measures of the intensity of trade
credit use in each sector. Finally, the collapse in trade could be due to composi-
tional effects. That is, if international trade happens disproportionately in sectors
whose domestic absorption (or production) collapsed the most, that would explain
why trade fell more than GDP. Two special cases of the compositional story are in-
vestment goods (Boileau 1999, Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust 2008) and durable goods
(Engel and Wang 2011). Since investment and durables consumption are several times
more volatile than GDP, trade in investment and durable goods would be expected
to experience larger swings than GDP as well. Thus, we collect measures of domestic
output at the most disaggregated available level, and check whether international
trade fell systematically more in sectors that also experienced the greatest reductions
in domestic output. In addition, we build an indicator for whether a sector produces
durable goods.
This paper is part of a growing literature on the features of the 2008-2009 global
crisis in general, and on the collapse in international trade in particular. Blanchard,
Das and Faruqee (2010) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) analyze the crisis expe-
rience in a large sample of countries, to establish which country characteristics can
best explain the cross-sectional variation in the severity of downturns. Imbs (2010)
documents the remarkable synchronicity of the crisis across a large set of countries.
Chor and Manova (2010) demonstrate that credit conditions in exporting countries
affected international trade during the current crisis. Bricongne, Fontagné, Gaulier,
Taglioni and Vicard (2009) and Behrens, Corcos and Mion (2010) use detailed firm-
level data to document the changes in trade at the micro level for France and Bel-
gium, respectively. Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2010a), Bems, Johnson and
Yi (2010), and Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2010) assess whether particular
channels, such as input-output linkages or inventory adjustment, can account for the
trade collapse in quantitative models. Our approach is deliberately agnostic, testing
empirically a wide range of hypotheses proposed in the literature. Our results thus
complement quantitative modeling efforts, by highlighting which of the mechanisms
appear most relevant empirically.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a set of stylized
facts on the recent trade collapse using detailed quarterly data on U.S. imports and
exports. Section 3.3 describes the construction of the international trade wedges, and
presents the behavior of those wedges over time and in different sectors. Section 3.4
uses detailed data on sectoral characteristics to assess whether the variation across




This section uses disaggregated quarterly data on U.S. imports and exports to
establish a number of striking patterns in the data. We discuss three aspects of the
recent episode: (i) its magnitude relative to historical experience; (ii) the sector- and
destination- level breakdown; and (iii) the behavior of prices and quantities separately.
The total imports, exports, and GDP data come from the U.S. National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA). The trade flows and prices disaggregated by sector
are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Trade in Goods and Services Database,
while trade flows disaggregated by partner are from the U.S. International Trade
Commission’s Tariffs and Trade Database.
Fact 1. As a share of economic activity, the collapse in U.S. exports and imports in
the recent downturn is exceptional by historical standards. Only the 2001 recession
is comparable.
Figure 3.1(a) plots quarterly values of imports and exports normalized by GDP
over the past 63 years, along with the recession bars. Visually, the 2008-09 collapse
appears larger than most changes experienced in the past.5 It is also clear, however,
that a similar drop occurred in 2001, a fact that appears underappreciated. Table
3.1 reports the change in the ratios of imports and exports to GDP during the 2008
and 2001 recessions, as well as the average changes in those variables during the
recessions that occurred between 1950 and 2000. For the 2008 and 2001 recessions,
the total declines are calculated both during the official NBER recession dates, and
with respect to the peak value of trade/GDP around the onset of the recession. It
is apparent that both the imports and exports to GDP decline by 14 to 30% during
the last two recessions, depending on the measure. By contrast, in all the pre-2000
recessions, the average decline in exports is less than 1 percentage point, and the
average change in imports is virtually nil. As an alternative way of presenting the
historical series, Figure 3.1(b) plots the deviations from trend in real imports, exports,
and GDP over the same period. To detrend the series, we use the Hodrick-Prescott
filter with the standard parameter of 1600. The recent period is characterized by
5The concurrent change in the exchange rate is relatively subdued. Figure 3.11 plots the long-
run path of the nominal and real effective exchange rates for the United States. Over the period
coinciding with the trade collapse, the U.S. dollar appreciated slightly in real terms, but the change
has been less than 10%.
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large negative deviations from trend for both imports and exports. We can see that
these are greater in magnitude than the deviation from trend in GDP.6
An important question is how large is the contribution of the collapse in the price
of oil, and the consequent reduction in the value of oil imports. The dotted line in
Figure 3.1(a) reports the evolution of non-oil imports as a share of GDP.7 It appears
that non-oil imports experience a similar percentage decline as a share of GDP as
the total imports. This conclusion is confirmed in Table 3.1, that reports the change
in non-oil imports as a share of GDP in the 2008-2009 and 2001 recessions. While
the overall imports to GDP ratio does decline more than non-oil imports during the
current crisis, the non-oil imports to GDP still decline by more than 20%.
Fact 2. For both U.S. exports and imports, the sharpest percentage drops are in the
automotive and industrial supplies sectors, with consumer goods trade experiencing a
far smaller percentage decrease. For imports, the decrease in the petroleum category
alone accounts for one third of the total decline.
Panel A of Table 3.2 reports the reductions in exports and imports by sector for
the recent trade collapse. While the overall reduction in nominal exports is about
26%, exports in the automotive sector (which comprises both vehicles and parts)
drop by 47%, and in industrial supplies by 34%. By contrast, exports of consumer
goods (−12%), agricultural output (−19%), and capital goods (−20%) experience less
than average percentage reductions. The table also reports the share of each of these
sectors in total exports at the outset of the crisis, as well as the absolute reductions in
trade. It is clear that industrial supplies and automotive sectors accounted for almost
40% of all U.S. goods exports, and their combined decrease accounts for more than
half of the total collapse of U.S. exports.
Total imports decline by 34%. The petroleum and products category has the
largest percentage decrease at −54%. It also accounts for some 20% of the pre-crisis
imports, and about 1/3 of the total absolute decline. The total non-oil imports
6How much of this decline in international trade is due to the extensive margin, that is, dis-
appearing import categories? While we do not have up-to-date information on the behavior of
individual firms, we can use highly disaggregated data on trade flows to shed light on this question.
To that end, we examined monthly import data at the Harmonized Tariff Schedule 8-digit classifi-
cation, which contains about 10,000 sectors. The number of HTS 8-digit categories with non-zero
imports does decline during this crisis, but the change is very small: while the U.S. recorded positive
monthly imports in 9,200-9,300 categories during the year leading up to June 2008, in the first half
of 2009 that number fell to about 9,100. These disappearing categories account for less than 0.5%
of the total reduction in imports over this period. Thus, when measured in terms of highly disag-
gregated import categories, the role of the extensive margin in the current trade collapse appears to
be minimal.
7This series starts in 1967, as the breakdown of imports into oil and non-oil is not available for
the earlier period.
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decline by 29%. As with exports, the next largest percentage declines are in the
automotive (−49%) and industrial supplies (−47%) sectors. By contrast, consumer
goods decrease by only 15%, and agricultural products by 9%.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the collapse in real trade over time. Figure 3.2
displays the trade in real goods and services separately. We can see that goods trade
is both larger in volume, and the decrease is more pronounced than in services. Figure
3.3 breaks total goods trade into real durables and non-durables, to highlight that
the reduction in the trade categories considered durable is more pronounced, for both
imports and exports. These figures indicate that in order to understand the collapse
in real trade flows, it is reasonable to focus on goods trade and examine durable goods
more closely. We follow this strategy in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
Fact 3. The collapse in U.S. foreign trade is significant across the major U.S. trading
partners, all of whom register double-digit percentage reductions in both imports and
exports.
Panel B of Table 3.2 reports the reduction, in absolute and percentage terms,
of exports and imports to and from the main regions of the world and the most
important individual partners within those regions. To be precise, the first three
columns, under “Exports,” report the exports from the U.S. to the various countries
and regions. Correspondingly, the columns labeled “Imports” report the imports to
the U.S. from these countries. The broad-based nature of the collapse is remarkable.
With virtually every major partner, U.S. exports are dropping by more than 20%
(with China and India being the notable exceptions at −15% and −13%), while
imports are dropping by 30% or more (with once again China and India as the main
exceptions at −16% and −21% respectively).
Fact 4. Both quantities and prices of exports and imports decreased, with changes in
real quantities explaining the majority of the nominal decrease in trade.
Figure 3.4 plots both nominal and real trade, each normalized to its 2005q1 value.
While nominal exports fall by 26% from its peak, the fall in real exports accounts
for about three quarters of that decline, 19%. For imports, the role of declining
import prices is greater. In addition, the peak in real imports occurred 3 quarters
earlier than the peak of nominal imports, due largely to the timing of the oil price
collapse. Nonetheless, real quantities account for about 60% of the total nominal
decline in imports. In order to abstract from the role of oil in the evolution of total
imports, the dotted lines report the real and nominal non-oil imports. The evolution
of non-oil trade is similar to the total, though the run-up in nominal trade and the
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subsequent reduction are less pronounced. Table 3.3 presents the nominal, real, and
price level changes in each export and import category. It is remarkable that in some
important sectors, such as automotive, capital goods, and consumer goods, the prices
did not move much at all, and the entire decline in nominal exports and imports is
accounted for by real quantities. By contrast, prices moved the most in industrial
supplies, especially petroleum. Figure 3.5 presents the contrast between nominal and
real graphically. It plots the nominal declines in each sector against the real ones,
along with the 45-degree line. For points on the 45-degree line, all of the nominal
decrease in trade is accounted for by movements in real quantities, with no change in
prices. For points farther from the line, price changes account for more of the nominal
change in trade. There are several things to take away from this figure. First, we
can see that some important sectors are at or very near the 45-degree line: all of the
change in nominal trade in those sectors comes from quantities. Second, petroleum
imports is by far the biggest exception, as the only sector in which most of the change
comes from prices. Finally, in most cases import and export prices experienced a drop
– the bulk of the points are below the 45-degree line. This implies that in the recent
episode, trade prices and quantities are moving in the same direction.
3.3 Wedges
The discussion of nominal and real quantities foreshadows the exercise in this
section. In particular, we ask, is there any way to assess whether the trade changes
during the recent crisis are in some sense “exceptional” or “abnormal”? That is,
how would we expect trade flows to behave in the recent recession? To provide
a model-based benchmark for the behavior of trade flows, we follow the “wedge”
methodology of Cole and Ohanian (2002) and Chari et al. (2007). We set down
an import demand equation that would be true in virtually any International Real
Business Cycle (IRBC) model, and check how the deviation from this condition, which
we call the “trade wedge,” behaves in the recent crisis relative to historical experience.
As the derivation is standard, we detail it in section 3.6.





+ ̂(C + I), (3.1)
where yf is demand for imports, C + I is overall aggregate demand (consumption
plus investment), P is the overall domestic price level, and pf is the price of imports.
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This equation provides a benchmark for evaluating whether the recent trade collapse
represents a large deviation from business as usual.8 They will hold exactly in any
model that features CES aggregation of foreign and domestic goods, a quite common
one in the IRBC literature. Economically, it ties real import demand to (i) overall
real domestic absorption (C + I); (ii) the overall domestic price level (P ); and (iii)
import prices pf . Since all of these are observable, we proceed by using equation (3.1)
to compute the log deviation from it holding exactly, calling it the “trade wedge.”
On the left-hand side is the log change in real imports. The term ̂(C + I) is captured
by the log change in the sum of real consumption and real investment in the national
accounts data; P̂ is the change in the GDP deflator,9 and p̂f is the change in the
import price deflator. We must also choose a value of the elasticity of substitution ε.
We report results for two values: ε = 1.5, which is the “classic” IRBC value of the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (Backus et al. 1995);
and ε = 6, which is a common value in the trade literature (Anderson and van
Wincoop 2004).10
We use quarterly data and compute year-to-year log changes in each variable.
Column 1 in Table 3.4 presents the value of the year-to-year wedge for 2009q2 (com-
8Our approach is related to another benchmark for analyzing trade volumes: the gravity equa-
tion. Starting from equation (3.8), the total nominal trade volumes can be expressed in terms of
prices and the nominal output as: pft y
f





Xt, where Xt ≡ Pt (Ct + It) is nomi-
nal GDP. The gravity approach proceeds to express pft as a function of trade costs and the source
country characteristics, usually the source country nominal GDP, X∗t . The advantage of the gravity
approach is that it uses less information, as it does not rely on knowing domestic and import prices.
The main disadvantage is that it imposes additional assumptions on the supply side, by taking a
stand on what determines pft . This leads to an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the current
experience: any shortfall of actual imports from what is implied by the evolution of nominal GDPs
must be attributed to an increase in trade costs (see, e.g., Jacks, Meissner and Novy 2009). In a
sense, by subsuming domestic prices and making strong assumption on import prices, the gravity
approach forces actual trade to be on the model-implied demand and supply curves exactly. By
contrast, our approach uses explicit information on domestic and import prices to gauge how far we
are from the model-implied demand curve.
9We also constructed a price index for just consumption and investment based on the consump-
tion and investment prices in the National Income and Product Accounts, and used that instead of
the GDP deflator. The results were virtually unchanged.
10Throughout this section, we assume that the taste parameter ω is not changing. If ω is thought
of as a taste shock in the demand for foreign goods, an alternative interpretation of the wedge would
be that it reveals what this taste shock must be in each period to satisfy the first-order condition for
import demand perfectly. In the IRBC literature, the parameter ω is sometimes thought of as a trade
cost, and its value calibrated to the observed share of imports to GDP. Under this interpretation,
it may be that during this crisis trade costs went up, thereby lowering imports. While we do not
have comprehensive data on total trade costs at high frequencies, anecdotal evidence suggests that
if anything shipping costs decreased dramatically in the course of the recent crisis, due in part to
the oil price collapse (Economist 2009). Thus, taking explicit account of shipping costs would make
the wedge even larger.
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puted relative to 2008q2) for the two elasticities. We choose to report the values for
2009q2 because it represents the trough in both international trade and the wedges
during the current trade collapse episode. The wedge is indeed quite large, at −40%
for the more conservative choice of ε. The negative value indicates, not surprisingly,
that imports fell by 40% more than overall U.S. domestic demand and price move-
ments would predict. To get a sense whether the current level of the wedge is out
of the ordinary, Figure 3.6 plots the quarterly values of the year-on-year wedge for
the period 1968 to the present. The recent period is indeed exceptional. Over the
entire sample period going back to 1968, the long-run average of the wedge is actually
slightly positive, at 2.9%, with a standard deviation of 10.2%.11 After 1984 – a year
widely considered to be a structural break, also evident in Figure 3.6 – the average
wedge is 1.6%, with a standard deviation of 6.6%. Thus, the current value of the
wedge is more than 6 standard deviations away from the mean, and from zero, when
compared to the post-1984 period. Note that a more muted instance of the “collapse
in the wedge” occurred in the 2001 recession. However, in that episode the wedge
reached −20%, well short of the current value.12
We can also determine whether price or quantity movements make up the bulk
of the current wedge. Real imports (the left-hand side of equation 3.1) fell by 21%,
while the total final demand ̂(C + I) fell by 6.7%. This implies that in the absence
of any relative price movements, the wedge would have been about −14%. The
price movements conditioned by the elasticity of substitution make up the rest of the
difference: the GDP deflator went up by 1.5%, while import prices actually fell by
16%.
The second column of Table 3.4 repeats the exercise for the non-oil imports.
Abstracting from oil reduces the wedge to −28%, a value that is still quite exceptional.
The post-1984 standard deviation in the non-oil wedge is 5.2%, with a mean of 1.3%.
Thus, the 2009q2 value of the non-oil wedge is more than 5 standard deviations away
from either its historical mean or zero.
11We conjecture that the positive long-run average value over this period may reflect a secular
reduction in trade costs, which we do not incorporate explicitly into our exercise.
12In the baseline analysis we compute the wedges based on log changes over time – in our case,
year-on-year changes in quarterly data. An alternative would be to compute them based on de-
viations from trend in each variable. To do this, we HP-detrended each series, and built a wedge
using equation (3.1) such that the caret means the log deviation from trend. This procedure yields
qualitatively similar results. In 2009q2 the overall wedge stands at −20%. This is considerably
smaller in magnitude than the baseline value we report. However, it is still quite exceptional by
historical standards. In the post-1984 period, the standard deviation of the deviation-from-trend
wedge is 4.8%, and its mean is very close to zero. This implies that the value of 2009q2 wedge is 4.3
standard deviations away from the historical average.
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3.3.1 Durable goods
Beyond the simple structure of the canonical IRBC model, this methodology can
be applied to construct a wedge for any sector that would be modelled as a CES
aggregate of domestic and foreign varieties. The key data limitation that prevents
the construction of wedges for disaggregated industries is the availability of domestic
absorption and price levels at the detailed level. We can make progress, however, for
one important sector: durable goods. Engel and Wang (2011) demonstrate that both
imports and exports are about 3 times more volatile than GDP in OECD countries,
and propose a compositional explanation. It is well known that durable goods con-
sumption is more volatile than overall consumption, and that much of international
trade is in durable goods. Putting the two together provides a reason for why trade is
more volatile than GDP: it is composed of the more volatile durables. This hypothesis
can be extended to apply to the recent crisis. It may be that imports and exports fell
so much relative to GDP because their composition is different from the composition
of GDP.
The wedges methodology can be used to shed light on the potential for this expla-
nation to work. If the reason for the fall in trade is compositional, then the wedges
should disappear (or at least get smaller) when we compute them on the durable
goods separately. By standard CES cost minimization, the “durable trade wedge”






where, as above, PD is the domestic price level of the durable spending, and p
f
D is
the price of the foreign durables. To construct the durable wedge, we use the BEA
definition of durable goods imports.13 Using sector-level price and quantity import
data, we construct the log change in real durable imports d̂f and in the prices of
durable imports p̂fD. To proxy for real durable demand D̂ we combine domestic
spending on consumer durables and fixed investment, building the corresponding
domestic durable price level.14
The third column of Table 3.4 reports the 2009q2 (to-date trough) value of the
year-to-year wedge. It is clear that the compositional explanation does have some
bite: for ε = 1.5 the durable wedge stands at −21%, or about half of the overall
13This roughly corresponds to the sum of capital goods; automotive vehicles, engines, and parts;
consumer durables; and durable industrial supplies and materials.
14Our calculation includes in D̂ structures and residential investment in addition to machinery
and equipment. This inclusion tends to make the durable wedge smaller, as real estate prices fell
more than overall investment goods prices, shrinking the price component of the durable wedge.
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wedge value. At the same time, even the durable wedge’s value is exceptional in this
period: it is about 4 standard deviations away from its post-1984 mean. Relative
to the overall wedge, the contribution of the real quantities to the durable wedge is
greater. Real durable imports fell by 34%, while the real durable domestic spending
fell by 18%. This implies that in the complete absence of relative price movements,
the “quantity wedge” would be about 16%. The rest of the wedge comes from relative
prices.
3.3.2 Final goods
We can make progress in shedding light on the compositional explanations in an-
other way. It may be that equation (3.7) is not a good description of the production
structure of the economy. One immediate possibility is that consumption and in-
vestment goods are very different. Indeed, Section 3.2 shows that consumption and
capital goods experienced different price and quantity movements. We can glean
further where the data diverge from the model by positing a production structure
in which investment and consumption goods are different, but both are produced
from domestic and foreign varieties (see, e.g., Boileau 1999, Erceg et al. 2008). Going
through the same cost minimization calculation, we obtain the import demands for










+ Î . (3.4)
These equations now relate the real reduction in consumption goods imports to the
overall domestic real consumption, the consumption price index, and the price index
of imported consumption goods, and same for investment. Provided that we have
data on all of these prices and quantities, we can calculate the “consumption trade
wedge” and the “investment trade wedge,” and determine which one reveals greater
deviations from the theoretical benchmark.
To construct these, we isolate imports of consumer goods (about 20% of total
U.S. imports at the outset of the crisis), and compute the real change in consumer
goods imports ĉf , and the corresponding import price change p̂fC . We then match
these up to the change in real consumption expenditures on goods Ĉ, and the domestic
consumption price index. Column 4 of Table 3.4 reports the results. The consumption
wedge is much smaller, at −6.4%. Figure 3.7 displays the time path of the year-on-
year consumption wedge since 1968. It is clear that the recent episode is completely
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unexceptional if we confine our attention to consumer goods trade. The consumption
wedge has a post-1984 mean of 4.4% and a standard deviation of 5.6%.
To construct the investment trade wedge, we isolate imports of capital goods
(also about 20% of U.S. imports at the outset of the crisis), and match them up
with investment data in the National Accounts. Column 5 of Table 3.4 presents the
results. The investment wedge is also quite small, at −10%. As Figure 3.7 shows,
it is unexceptional by historical standards: the mean investment wedge post-1984 is
2.5%, with a standard deviation of 5.9%. This implies that the current level of the
investment wedge is about one and a half standard deviations away from the historical
mean, or from the model implied value of zero.
These results tell us that the puzzle in the recent trade collapse is not in final
goods, be it consumption or investment. Instead, the discrepancy between the large
overall wedge and the small consumption and investment wedges appears to be in
the intermediate goods sectors, and these partially overlap with durable goods. This
suggests that modeling exercises that focus on movements in the final domestic de-
mand are unlikely to match the data well. Instead, explanations that focus on trade
in intermediates appear potentially more fruitful.
3.3.3 Other countries
Figure 3.8 reports the overall trade wedge, (3.1), for the other major developed
countries: Japan, Germany, U.K., France, Italy, and Canada. Within this group,
there is a fair bit of variation in the current behavior of the wedge.15 In only one
country, Japan, the current wedge has reached the level comparable to that or the
U.S., exceeding −60%. Germany, France, and Italy all experience large negative
wedges, of about −25%. While this does point to a shortfall in imports relative
to what would be predicted by the simple model, it is clearly much less drastic
when compared to both the current shortfalls in the U.S. and Japan, as well as
these countries’ historical variation in the wedge. By contrast, Canada and the U.K.
exhibit only a small departure from the norm in the current crisis, suggesting that
the behavior of imports in these countries is easily rationalized simply by movements
in aggregate demand and relative prices. Figure 3.9 reports the overall trade wedges
for selected emerging markets. Here, the experiences are just as diverse: while Korea,
Turkey, and the Czech Republic record wedges in the range of −20% to −30%, in
Mexico, for instance, the wedge is very close to zero.
15All the data used in this subsection come from the OECD.
70
To summarize, in both developed countries and emerging markets, there appears
to be a great deal of heterogeneity in the behavior of the trade wedges. This is in
spite of the fact that international trade itself collapsed in all of these countries to a
similar degree. This suggests that behind the superficial similarity in country expe-
riences, there is important heterogeneity in the underlying shocks and transmission
mechanisms. Sorting out this variation remains a fruitful direction for future research.
3.4 Empirical evidence
The framework set out in Section 3.3 is useful for framing a set of possible ex-
planations for the trade collapse and of hypotheses to test. When we focus on the
overall trade, we uncover a large shortfall in real imports, relative to what would
be implied by the final demand (C + I). What could be responsible for this large
divergence between the model and the data? The first possibility is that the model is
not rich enough. For instance, confining our attention to final goods imports reveals
that for consumption and investment goods, the shortfall is far less dramatic. Thus,
one of the potential explanations is trade in intermediate inputs and vertical linkages.
Second, it may be that the model is adequate, but agents – be it households or firms
– face additional constraints that prevent them from being on their demand curve.
This suggests that another potential explanation for the increase in the wedge is a
tightening of a financial constraint. Finally, it may be that when we compare the total
imports to total domestic demand, we are not comparing the same bundle of goods,
and thus it is important to examine the composition of trade. This last hypothesis
also points to the importance of looking at this phenomenon at a more disaggregated
level.
This is what we do in this section. In order to carry out empirical analysis, we
collect monthly nominal data for U.S. imports and exports vis-à-vis the rest of the
world at the NAICS 6-digit level of disaggregation from the USITC. This the most
finely disaggregated NAICS trade data available at the monthly frequency, yielding
about 450 distinct sectors. To reduce the noise in the monthly trade data, we ag-
gregate it to the quarterly frequency. For each sector, we compute the percentage
drop in trade flows over the course of a year ending in June 2009, and estimate the
following specification:
γtradei = α + βCHARi + γXi + εi.
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In this estimating equation i indexes sectors, γtradei is the percentage change in the
trade flow, which can be exports or imports, and CHARi is the sector-level variable
meant to capture a particular explanation proposed in the literature.16
We include a vector of controls Xi in each specification. Because we do not
have the required data at this level of disaggregation to construct the sector-level
wedges and their components, our regression estimates do not have a structural in-
terpretation. However, the functional form of the import demand equation, (3.1),
is informative about the kinds of variables we should control for. First, we control
for the elasticity of substitution between goods within a sector, sourced from Broda
and Weinstein (2006b). Second, we must try to proxy for the movements in domestic
demand and sector-level prices. To control for sector size, we include each industry’s
share in total imports (resp. exports) over the period 2002-2007, as well as labor
intensity computed from the U.S. Input-Output table. These are indicators avail-
able for both non-manufacturing and manufacturing industries. To check robustness,
we also control for skill and capital intensity sourced from the NBER productivity
database, and the level of inventories from the BEA, which are unfortunately only
available for manufacturing industries.17
Our strategy is to exploit variation in sectoral characteristics to evaluate three
main hypotheses: vertical production linkages, trade credit, and compositional ef-
fects/durables demand. We now describe each of them in turn. The vertical linkages
view, most often associated with Yi (2003), suggests that since much of international
trade is in intermediate inputs, and intermediates at different stages of processing
often cross borders multiple times, a drop in final consumption demand associated
with the recession will decrease cross-border trade in intermediate goods. This can
matter for the business cycle: di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) show that trade in
intermediate inputs leads to higher comovement between countries, both at sectoral
and aggregate levels. The simplest way to test the vertical linkage hypothesis is to
classify goods according to the intensity with which they are used as intermediate
inputs. We start with the 2002 benchmark version of the detailed U.S. Input-Output
16The change in trade is computed using the total values of exports and imports in each sector,
implying that it is a nominal change. As an alternative, we used import price data from the BLS at
the most disaggregated available level to deflate the nominal flows. The shortcoming of this approach
is that the import price indices are only available at a more coarse level of aggregation (about 4-digit
NAICS). This reduces the sample size, especially for exports, and implies that multiple 6-digit trade
flows are deflated using the same price index. Nonetheless, the main results were unchanged.
17We also re-estimated all of the specifications while dropping oil sectors: NAICS 211111 (Crude
Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction), 211112 (Natural Gas Liquid Extraction), and 324110
(Petroleum Refineries). All of the results below were unchanged.
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matrix available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and construct our measures
using the Direct Requirements Table. The (i, j)th cell in the Direct Requirements
Table records the amount of a commodity in row i required to produce one dollar of
final output in column j. By construction, no cell in the Direct Requirements Table
can take on values greater than 1. To build an indicator of “downstream vertical link-
ages,” we record the average use of a commodity in row i in all downstream industries
j: the average of the elements across all columns in row i. This measure gives the
average amount of good i required to produce one dollar worth of output across all
the possible final output sectors. In other words, it is the intensity with which good
i is used as an intermediate input by other sectors.
We build two additional indicators of downstream vertical linkages: the simple
number of sectors that use input i as an intermediate, and the Herfindahl index
of downstream intermediate use. The former is computed by simply counting the
number of industries for which the use of intermediate input i is positive. The latter
is an index of diversity with which different sectors use good i: it will take the
maximum value of 1 when only one sector uses good i as an input, and will take the
minimum value when all sectors use input i with the same intensity.
A related type of the vertical linkage story is the “disorganization” hypothesis
(Kremer 1993, Blanchard and Kremer 1997). In a production economy where inter-
mediate inputs are essential, following a disruption such as the financial crisis, shocks
to even a small set of intermediate inputs can create a large drop in output. For in-
stance, Blanchard and Kremer (1997) document that during the collapse of the Soviet
Union, output in more complex industries – those that use a greater number of inter-
mediate inputs – fell by more than output in less complex ones. This view suggests
that we should construct measures of “upstream vertical linkages,” that would cap-
ture the intensity and the pattern of intermediate good use by industry (in column)
j. The three indices we construct parallel the downstream measures described above.
We record the intensity of intermediate good use by industry j as total spending on
intermediates per dollar of final output. We also measure an industry’s complexity
in two ways: by counting the total number of intermediate inputs used by industry
j, and by computing the Herfindahl index of intermediate use shares in industry j.18
Burstein, Kurz and Tesar (2008) propose another version of the vertical linkage
hypothesis. They argue that it is not trade in intermediate inputs per se, but how
production is organized. Under “production sharing,” inputs are customized and the
18For more on these product complexity measures, see Cowan and Neut (2007) and Levchenko
(2007).
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factory in one country depends crucially on output from a particular factory in another
country. In effect, inputs produced on different sides of the border become essential,
and a shock to one severely reduces the output of the other. To build indicators of
production sharing, we follow Burstein et al. (2008) and use data on shipments by
multinationals from the BEA. In particular, we record imports from foreign affiliates
by their U.S. parent plus imports from a foreign parent company by its U.S. affiliate
as a share of total U.S. imports in a sector. Similarly, we record exports to the
foreign affiliate from their U.S. parents plus exports to a foreign parent from a U.S.
affiliate as a share of total U.S. exports. In effect, these measures of production
sharing are measures of intra-firm trade relative to total trade in a sector. We use the
BEA multinational data at the finest level of disaggregation that is publicly available,
which is about 2 or 3 digit NAICS, and take the average over the period 2002-2006
(the latest available years).
The second suggested explanation for the collapse in international trade is a con-
traction in trade credit (see, e.g., Auboin 2009, IMF 2009). Under this view, inter-
national trade is disrupted because importing domestic companies no longer extend
trade credit to their foreign counterparties. Without trade credit, foreign firms are
unable to produce and imports do not take place. Indeed, there is some evidence
that sectors more closely linked by trade credit relationships experience greater co-
movement (Raddatz 2011). To test this hypothesis, we used Compustat data to
build standard measures of trade credit intensity by industry. The first is accounts
payable/cost of goods sold. This variable records the amount of credit that is ex-
tended to the firm by suppliers, relative to the cost of production. The second is
accounts receivable/sales. This is a measure of how much the firm is extending credit
to its customers. These are the two most standard indices in the trade credit litera-
ture (see, e.g., Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende 2007). To construct them, we obtain
quarterly data on all firms in Compustat from 2000 to 2008, compute these ratios for
each firm in each quarter, and then take the median value for each firm across all the
quarters for which data are available. We then take the median of this value across
firms in each industry.19 Since coverage is uneven across sectors, we ensure that we
have at least 10 firms over which we calculate trade credit intensity. This implies
that sometimes the level of variation is at the 5-, 4-, and even 3-digit level, though
the trade data are at the 6-digit NAICS level of disaggregation.20
19We take medians to reduce the impact of outliers, which tend to be large in firm-level data.
Taking the means instead leaves the results unchanged.
20Amiti and Weinstein (2009) emphasize that trade credit in the accounting sense and trade
finance are distinct. Trade credit refers to payments owed to firms, while trade finance refers to
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Finally, another explanation for the collapse of international trade has to do with
composition. It may be that trade fell by more than GDP simply because international
trade occurs systematically in sectors that fell more than overall GDP. A way to
evaluate this explanation would be to control for domestic absorption in each sector.
While we do not have domestic absorption data, especially at this level of aggregation,
we instead proxy for it using industrial production indices. These indices are compiled
by the Federal Reserve, and are available monthly at about the 4-digit NAICS level of
disaggregation. They are not measured in the same units as import and export data,
since industrial production is an index number. Our dependent variables, however, are
percentage reductions in imports and exports, thus we can control for the percentage
reduction in industrial production to measure the compositional effect. Two special
cases of the compositional channel are due to Boileau (1999), Erceg et al. (2008), and
Engel and Wang (2011). These authors point out that a large share of U.S. trade is in
investment and durable goods, which tend to be more volatile than other components
of GDP. In order to explore this possibility, we classify goods according to whether
they are durable or not, and examine whether durable exports indeed fell by more
than nondurable ones.21
Table 3.12 reports the summary statistics for all the dependent and independent
variables used in estimation.
3.4.1 Vertical linkages
Table 3.5 describes the results of testing for the role of downstream vertical linkages
in the reduction in trade. In this and all other tables, the dependent variable is the
percentage reduction in imports (Panel A) or exports (Panel B) from 2008q2 to
2009q2.22 All throughout, we report the standardized beta coefficients, obtained by
first demeaning all the variables and normalizing each to have a standard deviation of
1. Thus, the regression coefficients correspond to the number of standard deviations
change in the left-hand side variable that would be due to a one standard deviation
change in the corresponding independent variable. We do this to better gauge the
short-term loans and guarantees used to cover international transactions. We are not aware of any
reliable sector-level measures of trade finance used by U.S. firms engaged in international trade.
21We created a classification of durables at the 3-digit NAICS level. Durable sectors include
23X (construction) and 325-339 (chemical, plastics, mineral, metal, machinery, computer/electronic,
transportation, and miscellaneous manufacturing). All other 1XX, 2XX, and 3XX NAICS categories
are considered non-durable for this exercise.
22The peak of both total nominal imports and total nominal exports in the recent crisis is August
2008. An alternative dependent variable would be the percentage drop from the peak to the trough.
However, that measure is more noisy because of seasonality. Therefore, we consider a year-on-year
reduction, sidestepping seasonal adjustment issues.
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relative importance of the various competing explanations, especially since the right-
hand side variables of interest have very different scales. In addition, in each column
we report the partial R2 associated with the variable(s) of interest. This allows us to
assess how successful each explanation is at accounting for the cross-sectoral variation.
There is evidence that downstream linkages play a role in the reduction in inter-
national trade, especially for imports into the United States. Goods that are used
intensely as intermediates (“Average Downstream Use”) experienced larger percent-
age drops in imports and exports. In addition, other proxies such as the number of
sectors that use an industry as an intermediate input as well as the Herfindahl index
of downstream intermediate use, are significant for imports, though not for exports.
The most successful indicatior of downstream linkages has a beta coefficient of −0.2,
implying that a one standard deviation increase in Average Downstream Use leads
to a reduction in trade that is 0.2 standard deviations larger. There is also some
evidence that the measure of production sharing based on trade within the multina-
tional firms are significantly correlated with a drop in imports, though not exports.
In terms of accounting for the variation in the data, the best downstream indicator
has a partial R2 of 0.04, same as the R2 that can be accounted for by the rest of the
controls: sector size, elasticity of substitution, and labor intensity.23
Table 3.6 examines instead the role of upstream vertical linkages, with more mixed
results. While some of the measures are significant for either imports or exports, and
all have the expected signs, there is no robust pattern of significance. The beta
coefficients are lower than the downstream coefficients, and the partial R2’s are on
the order of 1% in the best of cases.
3.4.2 Trade credit
Table 3.7 examines the hypothesis that trade credit played a role in the collapse
of international trade. In particular, it tests for whether imports and exports expe-
rienced greater percentage reductions in industries that use trade credit intensively.
As above, Panel A reports the results for imports, and Panel B for exports. There
appears to be no evidence that sectors that either use, or extend, trade credit more
intensively exhibited larger changes in trade flows. For imports, the beta coefficients
are all less than 5%, and the partial R2’s are virtually zero.
23Another feature of the vertical linkage hypothesis is that imports and exports will be positively
correlated within a sector. To check whether this affects the results, we estimated a Seemingly
Unrelated Regression model on the imports and exports equations jointly. The coefficients and the
standard errors were very similar to the simple OLS estimates reported in the Tables.
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Chor and Manova (2010) use monthly U.S. import data disaggregated by partner
country and sector, and a difference-in-differences approach to show that trade from
countries that experienced a greater credit contraction fell disproportionately more
in sectors that rely on external finance, have fewer tangible assets, or use more trade
credit. However, the question remains whether the differential effect of the credit
conditions emphasized by those authors translates into greater average reductions in
trade from countries hit especially hard by the credit crunch. To check whether this
is the case, we calculated, in each sector, the trade-weighted increase in the interbank





∆IBRATEc × atradeic , (3.5)
where ∆IBRATEc is the change in the interbank lending rate over the period
of the crisis in country c, and aic is the pre-crisis share of total U.S. trade in sector
i captured by country c. In the import equation, aic is thus the share of total U.S.
imports coming from country c in sector i, while in the export equation, aic is the share
of total U.S. exports in sector i going to country c. The variable name TWCCtradei
stands for “trade-weighted credit contraction.” In case of imports, its value will be
high if in sector i, a greater share of U.S. pre-crisis imports same from countries that
experienced a more severe credit crunch. Correspondingly, its value will be relatively
low if U.S. imports in that sector are dominated by countries that did not experience a
credit crunch during this period. The logic is similar for the export-based measure.24
Table 3.7 reports the results of using these measures. There is no evidence that
imports into the U.S. fell by more in sectors dominated by countries that experienced
largest credit crunches.25 Paradoxically, for U.S. exports the coefficient is statistically
significant but has the “wrong” sign, implying that U.S. sectors that export predomi-
nantly to countries with larger credit contractions grew more (fell by less) than other
sectors, all else equal. Our results are not in direct contradiction with those of Chor
and Manova (2010), as the bulk of that paper estimates the differential effects of
the credit crunch across sectors depending on their characteristics, such as external
24We are grateful to Davin Chor and Kalina Manova for sharing the interbank lending rate data
used in their paper. Their sample of countries is does not cover all of the U.S. imports and exports
in each sector, but it comes close, with the mean of 95% and medians of 97% for exports and 98%
for imports in our sample of 6-digit NAICS sectors.
25These results could be sensitive to the timing of the credit contraction. The Table reports
the estimates in which ∆IBRATEc is taken over the 12 month period from April of 2008 to April
2009 (the end point of the Chor-Manova dataset). The results are unchanged if we instead lag
∆IBRATEc by a further 6 or even 12 months.
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finance dependence. The difference-in-differences approach adopted by those authors
can only answer the question of whether trade changed differentially across sectors
depending on their reliance on trade credit or external finance. It does not answer
whether trade from countries experiencing greater credit contractions fell by more or
not. Thus, it is perfectly plausible that while changing credit conditions affect sectors
differentially, the average effect is nil – which is what we find. This point is under-
scored by the fact that over the period during which trade collapsed – mid-2008 to
mid-2009 – the interbank rates used by these authors actually fell in most countries,
reflecting aggressive monetary policy easing (see Figure 2 in Chor and Manova 2010).
If one believes the credit contraction hypothesis, this should have increased overall
trade rather than reduced it, ceteris paribus.
We can also examine the time evolution of trade credit directly. The Compus-
tat database contains information on accounts payable up to and including the first
quarter of 2009 for a substantial number of firms. While there are between 7,000 and
8,000 firms per quarter with accounts payable data in the Compustat database over
the period 2007-2008, there are 6,250 firms for which this variable is available for
2009q1. While this does represent a drop-off in coverage that may be non-random, it
is still informative to look at what happens to trade credit for those firms over time.
With this selection caveat in mind, we construct a panel of firms over 2000-2009q1
for which data are available at the end of the period, and trace out the evolution of
accounts payable as a share of cost of goods sold. The median value of this variable
across firms in each period is plotted in Figure 3.10(a). The dashed line represents
the raw series. There is substantial seasonality in the raw series, so the solid black
line reports it after seasonal adjustment. The horizontal line plots the mean value of
this variable over the entire period.26 There is indeed a contraction in trade credit
during the recent crisis, but its magnitude is very small. The 2009q1 value of this
variable is 55.2%, just 1.3% below the period average of 56.5%, and only 3 percentage
points below the most recent peak of 58.1% in 2007q4. We conclude from this that
the typical firm in Compustat experienced at most a small contraction in trade credit
26It is suggestive from examining the raw data that there is no time trend in this variable. We
confirm this by regressing it on a time trend: the coefficient on the time trend turns out to be very
close to zero, and not statistically significant.
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it receives from other firms.27
Figure 3.10(b) presents the median of the other trade credit indicator, accounts
receivable/sales over the period 2004q1-2009q1. The coverage for this variable is not
as good: there are very few firms that report it before 2004, and there are only around
6,000 observations per quarter in 2007-2008. In 2009q1, there are 4,967 firms that
report this variable, and we use this sample of firms to construct the time series for
the median accounts receivable. Once again, the decrease during the recent crisis is
very small: the 2009q1 value of 56.3% is only 1 percentage point below the period
average of 57.3%, and just 2 percentage points below the 2007q4 peak of 58.5%.
Indirectly, accounts receivable may be a better measure of the trade credit conditions
faced by the typical firm in the economy, as it measures the credit extended by big
Compustat firms to (presumably) smaller counterparts. But the picture that emerges
from looking at the two series is quite consistent: there is at most a small reduction
in trade credit during the recent downturn.
3.4.3 Composition
Finally, Table 3.8 tackles the issue of composition and durability. There appears
to be robust evidence that compositional effects play a role. Both exports and imports
tend to collapse more in industries where industrial production contracted more. The
beta coefficients are relatively high (0.34 and 0.21 for industrial production, 0.20 and
0.11 for the durable dummy), and the partial R2’s are also high relative to other
potential explanatory variables. The coefficient on the durable 0/1 dummy implies
that on average imports in durable sectors contracted by 9.2 percentage points more
than non-durable ones, and exports in durable sectors contracted by 4.8 percentage
points more. These results further support the conclusions of Section 3.3.1, which
shows that accounting explicitly for the durables sector reduces the magnitude of the
wedge considerably.
There is an alternative way to examine how much composition may matter. We
can compare the data on percentage reductions in exports and imports with data on
industrial production at sector level. According to the compositional explanation,
imports and exports will drop relative to the level of overall economic activity if in-
27It may be that while the impact on the median firm is small, there is still a large aggregate
effect due to an uneven distribution of trade credit across firms. To check for this possibility, we built
the aggregate accounts payable/cost of goods sold series, by computing the ratio of total accounts
payable for all the firms to the sum of all cost of goods sold for the same firms. The results from
using this series are even more stark: it shows an increase during the crisis, and its 2009q1 value
actually stands above its long-run average.
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ternational trade flows are systematically biased towards sectors in which domestic
absorption fell the most. Composition will account for all of the reduction in imports
and exports relative to economic activity if at sector level, reductions in trade per-
fectly matched reductions in domestic absorption, and all that was different between
international trade and economic activity was the shares going to each sector. By
contrast, composition will account for none of the reduction in trade relative to out-
put if there are no systematic differences in the trade shares relative to output shares,
at least along the volatility dimension. Alternatively, composition will not explain
the drop in trade if imports and exports simply experienced larger drops within each
sector than did total absorption.
With this logic in mind, we construct a hypothetical reduction in total trade that







In this expression, i = 1, ..., I indexes sectors, atradei is the initial share of sector i in
the total trade flows, and γIPi is the percentage change in industrial production over
the period of interest. That is, γ̃trade is the percentage reduction in overall trade that
would occur if in each sector, trade was reduced by exactly as much as industrial
production. Following the rest of the empirical exercises in this section, we compute




Table 3.9 reports the results. For both imports and exports, the first column
reports the percentage change in nominal trade, the second column the percentage
change in real trade, and the third column reports γ̃trade, the hypothetical reduction
in trade that would occur if in each sector, trade fell by exactly as much as industrial
production. Because goods trade data are available for a greater range of sectors than
industrial production data, the last column reports the share of total U.S. trade flows
that can be matched to industrial production. We can see that we can match 88%
of exports and 94% of imports to sectors with IP data. Nonetheless, the fact that
this table does not capture all trade flows explains the difference between the values
reported there and in Table 3.2. For ease of comparison, the last line of the table
reports the percentage change in the total industrial production. By construction,
the actual and implied values are identical.
We can see that industrial production fell by 13.5%, while the matching nominal
80
imports and exports fell by 34.3% and 35.0%, respectively. Comparing the actual
changes in nominal trade to the implied ones in column 3, we can see that composition
“explains” about half: the implied reduction in exports is 18.1%, and the implied
reduction in imports 16.1%. As expected, both of these are larger than the fall in
industrial production itself. The real reductions in trade (column 2) are smaller, as
we saw above. Thus, γ̃trade is about two-thirds of the real change in exports, and 83%
of the change in real imports.
We conclude from this exercise that the actual pattern of trade is consistent with
the presence of compositional effects: it does appear that international trade is sys-
tematically biased towards sectors with larger domestic output reductions. The simple
assumption that trade in each sector fell by the same amount as industrial production
can “account” for between 50% and almost 85% of the actual drop in trade flows.
Several caveats are of course in order to interpret the results. First and foremost,
this is an accounting exercise rather than an economic explanation. We do not know
why trade flows are systematically biased towards sectors with larger falls in domestic
output, nor do we have a good sense of why some sectors had larger output reductions
than others.28 It also does not explain why the trade collapse during this recession
is so different from most previous recessions. Second, it is far from clear that trade
falling by the same proportion as output is an accurate description of what happened.
Indeed, as evidenced by columns 1 and 3 of Table 3.8, the percentage change in IP
as a dependent variable explains only 11% of the variation in imports, and 4.4%
of the variation in exports.29 Finally, industrial production may not be an entirely
appropriate benchmark, since it captures domestic output, while a more conceptu-
ally correct measure would be domestic absorption. Nonetheless, our exercise does
provide suggestive evidence of compositional effects.
To combine the above results together, Table 3.10 reports specifications in which
all the distinct explanations are included together. The first column presents results
for all sectors and the baseline set of control variables. The second column reports the
results for manufacturing sectors only, which allows us to include additional controls
such as capital and skill intensity. The bottom line is essentially unchanged: both
28Indeed, benchmarking the trade drop to the drop in industrial production leaves open the
question of why the reduction in industrial production itself is so much larger than in GDP: while
total GDP contracted by 3.8% in the recent episode, industrial production fell by 13.5%.
29While the table reports the standardized beta coefficient, the simple OLS coefficient on the
change in industrial production is about 0.58, implying that a given change in IP is associated with
a change in trade of just over half the magnitude. While this coefficient may be biased due to
measurement error in IP data, taken at face value it implies a less than one-for-one relationship
between IP and trade changes.
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downstream linkages and compositional effects are robustly significant for imports,
while upstream linkages and trade credit are not.30 When it comes to magnitudes, it
appears that the downstream linkage variable and the durable indicator are roughly
of the same magnitude, on both on the order of 0.2-0.3. All together, the regressors
of interest – downstream and upstream linkages, trade credit, and composition –
explain about 9% of the cross-sectoral variation in the full sample, and 12% in the
manufacturing sample. For exports, there is also suggestive evidence that downstream
linkages and compositional effects continue to matter, but the results are less robust.
In the subsample of the manufacturing sectors in columns 2 and 4, we also control
for inventories. We use monthly inventory data for 3-digit NAICS sectors from the
BEA. Unfortunately, this coarse level of aggregation implies that we only have 20
distinct sectors for which we can record inventory levels. The particular variable
we use is the ratio of inventories to imports (resp., exports) at the beginning of the
period, 2008q2.31 The initial level of inventories is not significant, and its inclusion
leaves the rest of the results unchanged. In addition, it appears to have the “wrong”
sign: sectors with larger initial inventories had smaller reductions in imports, all else
equal. These estimates are not supportive of the hypothesis that imports collapsed
in part because agents decided to deplete inventories as a substitute to buying more
from abroad.32
3.4.4 Aggregation
How much of the aggregate reduction in trade can be accounted for by the leading
explanations evaluated above? The magnitude and significance of the coefficients of
interest are informative about how successful they are in explaining the cross-sectoral
variation. However, it is not clear whether these explanations have an appreciable
30Indeed, in the manufacturing-only sample, the trade credit variable is significant but with the
“wrong” sign for both imports and exports: it implies that trade in credit-intensive industries fell
by less.
31Alternatively, we used the average level of inventories to imports (resp., exports) over the
longer period, 2001-2007, and the results were unchanged. We also used the percentage change in
inventories that happened contemporaneously with the reduction in trade, and the coefficient was
insignificant: it appears that there is no relationship between changes in inventories and changes in
trade flows over this period.
32Alessandria et al. (2010a) argue for the importance of inventory adjustment as an explanation
for why trade fell by more than output. The quantitative exercise in that paper focuses on the auto
sector. As evident from Table 3.2, while the auto sector experienced large reductions in cross-border
trade, it is far from the only sector that did so. In addition, as reported in Table 3.2, at the outset
of the crisis the auto sector accounted for 9% of U.S. exports and 11% of U.S. imports. Thus, at
a purely mechanical level, the auto sector accounted for at most one-sixth of the total reduction in
either imports and exports.
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impact on changes in the aggregate trade. For instance, it may be that goods with
greatest downstream linkages – that fell systematically more, as indicated by our
estimates – are also responsible for a tiny share of the overall imports. In this case,
downstream linkages, though statistically significant, would not account for much of
the aggregate reduction in trade.
To shed light on these issues, we perform an aggregation exercise in the spirit of ((
di Giovanni and Levchenko 2010)2009, 2010). The aggregate reduction in total trade








ai (γ̂i + εi)
where, once again, i indexes sectors, ai is the share of sector i in the aggregate trade
flow, and γi is the actual percentage reduction in trade in sector i. The second line
writes the actual reduction in trade in sector i as the sum of the predicted reduction γ̂i
and the residual – an equality that holds by construction. Since the predicted change
in trade in sector i can be expressed in terms of the actual values of the right-hand



































Note that the last term, Residuals, equals zero by construction. In order to per-
form this decomposition, we use the coefficient estimates in columns 1 and 3 of Table
3.10, in which all of the explanations are included together in the full sample of sec-
tors. The point estimates and the standard errors are reported in Table 3.11. For
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imports, the Composition Effect can account for a 6.9% reduction in trade, out of
a total 29.9% drop.33 The Downstream Effect accounts for a further 4% reduction.
By contrast, the Trade Credit Effect goes the “wrong” way, showing a 5.9% increase
in trade, though of course it is not statistically significant. The remaining controls
together imply a 10.2% reduction. Surprisingly, the Upstream Effect is the largest,
showing a 13.4% drop in trade. However, as evident from the regression table, the
coefficient on the Upstream variable is not robustly statistically significant. For ex-
ports, both the Composition and the Downstream Effects are smaller, at 3.4 and
2.2%, respectively. Controls account for more than half of the observed reduction,
18.5%.
We conclude from this exercise that the two robustly statistically significant ex-
planations – composition and downstream linkages – are also relevant quantitatively,
together accounting for some 40% of the observed reduction in imports, and nearly
20% of exports.
3.4.5 Is the 2008-2009 crisis different?
We can use our estimation approach to examine the changes in international
trade during previous economic downturns. To that end, we assembled monthly data
on imports and exports, as well as the data on sectoral characteristics, for the two
previous recessions, 1991 and 2001. Since the NAICS classification did not exist in
1991, all of the data are recorded in the SIC classification for that episode. For the
1991 recession, the indicators of intermediate input linkages (both downstream and
upstream) were re-calculated based on the 1987 Benchmark Input-Output Table, and
trade credit variables were computed from the pre-1990 data in Compustat. Similarly,
measures of factor intensity were calculated based on the I-O Table and the NBER
Productivity Database for the pre-1990 period. Finally, we also collected data for
inventories and industrial production for the 1980s and early 1990s.34 For the 2001
recession, we continue to use the intermediate input indicators based on the 2002
Benchmark Input-Output Tables that were used in the main analysis, as it is unlikely
that the I-O structure would have experienced noticeable changes between 2001 and
2002. The other variables – trade credit intensity, export and import shares, factor
intensity, and inventories – were re-computed using pre-2001 data.
33Once again, the total reductions in imports and exports reported in this table are different from
what appears in the summary statistics, as the regression specification underlying this table does
not cover all sectors due to the unavailability of some regressors of interest.
34The historical IP data are no longer publicly available in the SIC classification. We are very
grateful to Charlie Gilbert at the Federal Reserve Board for providing these data.
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To keep the approach consistent with the main analysis above, we average monthly
trade data at the quarterly frequency, and take the year-on-year changes to avoid
seasonality issues. For the 1991 recession, there is no dramatic change in trade. Thus,
we take the difference between 1991q4 and 1990q4 as our left-hand side variable. For
the 2001 recession, the peak in both imports and exports is December 2000, also
coinciding with the peak of the business cycle. Thus, we take the 2000q4 to 2001q4
change as the dependent variable.35
Table 3.13 reports the results. The first main conclusion is that the sectoral
characteristics have much less explanatory power in accounting for the sectoral cross-
section of trade changes. While the overall R2 that we could achieve for the 2008-09
crisis could be as high 13.5% for all sectors and 20% for manufacturing, the best we
can do for 1991 and 2001 is about 3 to 7% for all sectors and 10% for manufacturing.
This is not surprising: while the average changes in cross-border trade flows were much
smaller in these two episodes, their standard deviations were quite similar across the
three recessions. Thus, idiosyncratic sectoral shocks – essentially the error term in
our regressions – were relatively more important in 1991 and 2001. Paradoxically,
while in the current recession the aggregate trade changes are much more of a puzzle
as evidenced by Section 3.3, we have a much better handle on the cross-sectoral
variation.
Second, the only consistently robust explanatory variable in 1991 and 2001 is the
Durable indicator. It is significant for all but the 2001 exports. The magnitudes
of the beta coefficients are smaller, but roughly in line, with what we found for the
2008-09 recession. There is some evidence that vertical linkages mattered for some
trade flows, but it is not robust across episodes and flows.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper uses highly disaggregated monthly data on U.S. imports and exports to
examine the anatomy of the recent collapse in international trade. We show that this
collapse is exceptional in two ways: it is far larger relative to economic activity than
what has been observed in previous U.S. downturns; and it is far larger than what
would be predicted by the evolution of domestic absorption and prices over the same
period. Cross-sectional patterns of declines are consistent with vertical specialization
and compositional effects as (at least partial) explanations for the collapse. By con-
35We experimented with various start dates for both recessions, and the results were not materially
affected.
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trast, we do not detect any impact of trade credit on the reduction in international
trade.
An important next step in this research agenda is to develop a theoretical frame-
work that can be quantitatively successful at replicating this collapse in trade. Doing
so will enable us to use this episode as a laboratory to distinguish between the dif-
ferent models of international transmission. Our hope is that the empirical results
in this paper can offer some guidance as to which channels are likely to be most
promising. In particular, our findings on compositional effects and vertical linkages
point to the crucial importance of developing quantitative models featuring a realis-
tic sectoral production structure and trade patterns. This will allow the researcher
to model both input-output linkages and systematic differences in the sectoral com-
position of production and trade patterns. Recent advances in the closed economy
(Carvalho 2008), and open economy settings (Boileau 1999, Erceg et al. 2008, Engel
and Wang 2011, Imbs 2010, Jin 2009) appear promising in this regard. By contrast,
we do not find much of a role for financial variables in the collapse of trade. This
of course does not imply that the financial crisis did not have macroeconomic conse-
quences. Rather, financial shocks appear to have affected trade insofar as they had




We begin with the simplest 2-good IRBC model of Backus et al. (1995). There
are two countries, Home and Foreign, and two intermediate goods, one produced in
Home, the other in Foreign. There is one final good, used for both consumption and
investment. The resource constraint of the Home country in each period is given by:


















where Ct is Home consumption, It is Home investment, y
h
t is the output of the Home
intermediate good that is used in Home production, and yft is the amount of the
Foreign intermediate used in Home production. In this standard formulation, con-
sumption and investment are perfect substitutes, and Home and Foreign goods are
aggregated in a CES production function. The parameter ω allows for a home bias
in preferences.
The household (or, equivalently, a perfectly competitive final goods producer),
































where pht is the price of the domestically-produced good and p
f
t is the price of the im-
























is the standard CES price level.
Log-linearizing these, we obtain the import demand relationship in log changes
given in equation (3.1).
The derivation is essentially the same for subcomponents of final demand. In
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particular, suppose that durable goods consumption in the Home country, Dt, is an















where dht is the domestic durable variety consumed in Home, and d
f
t is the Foreign
durable variety consumed in Home. In other words, a “final durable goods” pro-
ducer aggregates domestically-produced durable intermediates with foreign-produced
durable intermediates to create a durable good that can be used either as purchases
of new durable consumption goods or capital investment.36 Cost minimization then
produces the expression for the durable wedge in equation (3.2).
Similarly, suppose that investment and consumption goods are different, but both





































In this formulation, domestic consumption goods cdt are different from domestic in-
vestment goods idt , and the same holds for the foreign consumption and investment
goods. These production functions then lead to the consumption and investment
wedges in equations (3.3) and (3.4).
36This formulation may appear to sidestep the special feature of durable goods, namely that it is
the stock of durables that enters utility. In our formulation, equation (3.9) defines the flow of new
durable goods, rather than the stock. Our assumption is then that the flow of new durable goods
is a CES aggregate of the flows of foreign and domestic durable purchases, dht and d
f
t . We can then
define the stock of durables by its evolution Dt = (1 − δ)Dt−1 + Dt, with the stock Dt entering
the utility function. An alternative assumption would be that foreign and domestic durables have
separate stocks, and consumer utility depends on a CES aggregate of domestic and foreign durable
stocks (this is the assumption adopted by Engel and Wang 2011). A priori, we find no economic
reason to favor one set of assumptions over the other, while our formulation is much more amenable
to analyzing prices and quantities jointly. This is because statistical agencies record quantities and
prices of purchases, which are flows.
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Notes: This table reports the percent reductions in Exports/GDP and Im-
ports/GDP during the 2008 and 2001 recessions and the average for all the down-
turns from 1950 to 2000. Column “Recession” reports the change in the trade
variables during the official NBER recession (2007-2009 recession to 2009q2). Col-
umn “From Peak” reports the change from the peak of the trade ratios to the
trough (for 2001), and to the current trough (2009q2). Source: National Income
and Product Accounts.
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Table 3.2. Disaggregated trade flows, nominal
Exports Imports
Share Abs. Change % Change Share Abs. Change % Change
Total 1.00 -348.1 -26% 1.00 -765.7 -34%
Total, excluding petroleum 0.78 -495.8 -29%
Panel A: By Sector
Foods, feeds, and beverages 0.09 -21.5 -19% 0.04 -8.2 -9%
Industrial supplies and materials 0.30 -134.9 -34% 0.15 -155 -47%
Durable goods 0.10 -50.3 -36% 0.08 -84.2 -50%
Nondurable goods 0.20 -84.6 -33% 0.07 -70.8 -44%
Petroleum and products 0.22 -269.9 -54%
Capital goods, except automotive 0.35 -94.6 -20% 0.21 -123.7 -26%
Civilian aircraft, engines, and parts 0.06 -3.7 -5% 0.02 -6.7 -18%
Computers, peripherals, and parts 0.04 -11.0 -24% 0.05 -23.7 -22%
Other 0.26 -79.9 -23% 0.15 -93.3 -29%
Automotive vehicles, engines, and parts 0.09 -58.1 -47% 0.11 -121.4 -49%
Consumer goods, except automotive 0.12 -19.5 -12% 0.22 -75.5 -15%
Durable goods 0.07 -23.0 -24% 0.12 -50.2 -18%
Nondurable goods 0.05 3.6 5% 0.10 -25.2 -11%
Other 0.04 -19.6 -35% 0.04 -11.8 -12%
Panel B: By Destination
Canada 0.19 -80.6 -33% 0.17 -157.7 -43%
Asia 0.25 -80.2 -26% 0.34 -170.2 -24%
China 0.06 -10.5 -15% 0.15 -51.4 -16%
India 0.01 -2.3 -13% 0.01 -5.1 -21%
Japan 0.05 -20.3 -31% 0.07 -61.2 -42%
Taiwan 0.02 -10.9 -42% 0.02 -10.0 -28%
EU25 0.22 -68.0 -25% 0.18 -120.1 -31%
Germany 0.04 -16.2 -30% 0.05 -40.5 -39%
United Kingdom 0.04 -13.8 -25% 0.03 -17.1 -28%
Eastern Europe 0.01 -4.8 -49% 0.01 -3.8 -31%
Latin America 0.21 -76.8 -29% 0.18 -132.6 -33%
Brazil 0.02 -7.8 -28% 0.01 -13.9 -43%
Mexico 0.11 -37.6 -28% 0.11 -67.3 -29%
OPEC 0.04 -9.9 -18% 0.10 -146.5 -60%
Australia 0.02 -5.5 -26% 0.00 -4.0 -35%
Notes: This table reports the percentage decrease in nominal U.S. exports and imports over the
period 2008q2 to 2009q2, disaggregated by sector (Panel A) and by destination (Panel B). Source:
National Income and Product Accounts and U.S. International Trade Commission.
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Table 3.3. Nominal trade flows, real trade flows, and prices
Exports Imports
Nominal Real Price Nominal Real Price
Total -26.2% -18.9% -9.0% -34.4% -21.4% -16.5%
Total, excluding petroleum -28.7% -24.5% -5.6%
Foods, feeds, and beverages -18.5% -6.7% -12.7% -9.1% -4.7% -4.8%
Industrial supplies and materials -33.9% -13.8% -23.3% -47.1% -30.3% -24.0%
Durable goods -36.4% -20.2% -20.3% -50.2% -35.0% -23.4%
Nondurable goods -32.6% -10.3% -24.9% -43.8% -25.6% -24.5%
Petroleum and products -54.2% -7.1% -50.7%
Capital goods, except automotive -20.2% -19.0% -1.5% -26.3% -25.3% -1.4%
Civilian aircraft, engines, and parts -4.8% -9.4% 5.0% -17.6% -21.7% 5.3%
Computers, peripherals, and parts -23.7% -16.8% -8.2% -21.9% -16.3% -6.7%
Other -23.2% -21.6% -2.0% -28.8% -28.6% -0.4%
Automotive vehicles, engines, and parts -46.6% -46.8% 0.6% -48.9% -49.1% 0.3%
Consumer goods, except automotive -11.9% -11.4% -0.6% -15.2% -14.6% -0.7%
Durable goods -24.5% -25.0% 0.6% -18.4% -17.2% -1.5%
Nondurable goods 5.2% 7.5% -2.2% -11.3% -11.5% 0.2%
Other -34.7% -28.5% -8.8% -12.4% -11.3% -1.2%
Notes: This table reports the percentage decrease in nominal U.S. exports and imports over the
period 2008q2 to 2009q2, the percentage change in real U.S. exports and imports, and the percentage
change in the price of exports and imports, by sector. Source: National Income and Product
Accounts.
Table 3.4. Trade wedges
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ε Overall Overall, Non-Oil Durable Consumption Investment
1.5 -0.401 -0.278 -0.205 -0.064 -0.105
6 -1.190 -0.648 -0.342 0.072 -0.203
Notes: This table reports the wedges calculated for 2009q2 with respect to












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.9. Compositional effects: change in trade flows as implied by industrial
production.
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Exports -34.3% -25.0% -18.1% 0.88
Imports -35.0% -19.4% -16.1% 0.94
IP -13.5% -13.5% 1.00
Notes: Changes in nominal and real exports over 2008q2 to 2009q2 for NAICS sectors where indus-
trial production (IP) data are available. Weights calculated from share of nominal trade and used to
generate the third column. The fourth column indicates the fraction of overall nominal trade that

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.11. Decomposition of the aggregate reduction in trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Composition Downstream Upstream Trade Credit Controls Constant
(γA) Effect Effect Effect Effect
Imports
-0.299 -0.069 -0.040 -0.134 0.059 -0.102 -0.014
(0.019) (0.010) (0.075) (0.076) (0.045) (0.084)
Exports
-0.304 -0.034 -0.022 -0.021 0.007 -0.185 -0.050
(0.021) (0.010) (0.069) (0.048) (0.052) (0.075)
Notes: This table presents a decomposition of the actual aggregate change in trade
into components given in equation (3.6). Standard errors are reported in parenthe-
ses.
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1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Imports
Exports GDP
(b) Imports, Exports, and GDP in Deviations from Trend
Notes: The top panel plots the ratios of imports/GDP and exports/GDP for the U.S., along with
the NBER recession bars. The bottom panel plots total imports, exports, and GDP in deviations
from HP trend with parameter 1600. Source: National Income and Product Accounts.
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Notes: This figure reports the total real exports (top panel) and real imports (bottom panel), of
both goods and services. Source: National Income and Product Accounts.
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Notes: This figure reports the total real exports (top panel) and real imports (bottom panel), of
both durable and non-durable goods. Source: National Income and Product Accounts.
101





























Notes: This figure reports the evolution of nominal and real exports (top panel) and imports (bottom
panel). Both the nominal and real series are normalized to 2005. Source: National Income and
Product Accounts.
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% change real trade
Exports Imports
Notes: This figure plots the percentage changes in real imports and exports against the percentage
changes in nominal imports and exports, by EndUse sector, along with a 45-degree line. Source:
National Income and Product Accounts.
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Notes: This figure plots the wedges for total imports and the durable imports. Source: National
Income and Product Accounts and authors’ calculations.








1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Consumption wedge
Investment wedge
Notes: This figure plots the wedges for consumption imports and investment imports. Source:
National Income and Product Accounts and authors’ calculations.
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1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Canada
Notes: This figure plots the wedges for total imports for a selected set of countries. Source: OECD
and authors’ calculations.
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1995 2000 2005 2010
Czech Republic
Notes: This figure plots the wedges for total imports for a selected set of countries. Source: OECD
and authors’ calculations.
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Average Non-Seas. Adj. Seas. Adj.
(b) Accounts Receivable/Sales
Notes: The top panel of this figure displays the median value of accounts payable/cost of goods sold
across firms in each period. The bottom panel reports the median value of accounts receivable/sales
across firms in each period. Source: Compustat.
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Table 3.12. Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Independent Variables
Percentage Change in Imports -0.253 0.227 -1.000 0.861
Percentage Change in Exports -0.209 0.214 -0.969 0.744
Downstream Indicators
Average Downstream Use 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.013
Number of Downstream Industries 102 111 1 419
Downstream Herfindahl 0.220 0.223 0.009 1.000
Production Sharing (exports) 0.196 0.133 0.005 0.612
Production Sharing (imports) 0.150 0.139 0.000 0.577
Upstream Indicators
Intermediate Use Intensity 0.631 0.122 0.254 0.949
Number of Intermediates Used 113 26 46 218
Herfindahl of Intermediate Use 0.094 0.066 0.028 0.532
Credit Indicators
Accounts Payable/Cost of Goods Sold 0.469 0.141 0.194 1.733
Accounts Receivable/Sales 0.532 0.131 0.156 0.817
TWCC (imports) -2.691 0.493 -5.594 -1.178
TWCC (exports) -2.721 0.392 -4.190 -0.411
Compositional Indicators
Percentage Change in Industrial Production -0.179 0.121 -0.757 0.036
Durable dummy 0.588 0.493 0 1
Control Variables
Share in Total Imports 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.088
Share in Total Exports 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.045
Elasticity of Substitution 6.8 10.7 1.2 103
Labor Intensity 0.633 0.229 0.049 0.998
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the
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Notes: This figure displays the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate and the Real Effective Exchange
Rate for the United States. Source: International Monetary Fund.
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